Mechanism design, Mathematical Economics and Statistics: Prospect theory, First Price auctions, Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem - Couverture souple

Josheski, Dushko; Karamazova, Elena; Apostolov, Mico

 
9786202552813: Mechanism design, Mathematical Economics and Statistics: Prospect theory, First Price auctions, Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem
Couverture souple
ISBN 10 : 6202552816 ISBN 13 : 9786202552813
Editeur : LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing, 2020

Synopsis

This books covers three topics in mathematical economics and economics theory which are solved by the use of methods from mathematical statistics. It starts with a mechanism design that covers themes such as: Vickrey–Clarke–Groves Mechanism, Vickrey auction, Mechanism Design Illustrated in a Walrasian Example,Constructing Decentralized Mechanisms, from Parameter Indexed Product Structures: Transition to Message-Indexed Product Structures. Than it continues with Prospect theory that covers themes such as: Prospect theory and Cumulative prospect theory, and their use in explanation of overbidding. And the final essay is: Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem and asymmetric FPA auctions, that includes numerical solution of the asymmetric auctions.

Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.

Éditeur
LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing
Date d'édition
2020
Langue
anglais
ISBN 10 
6202552816
ISBN 13 
9786202552813
Reliure
Broché
Nombre de pages
100
Coordonnées du fabricant
non disponible
Personne responsable
KreGa Onlinehandel GmbH
4950000000000
info@krega-onlinehandel.de

Birkenweg 31
Brakel
33034
Allemagne