Articles liés à Economic Analysis of Liability Rules
Synopsis
This book focuses on the analysis of liability rules of tort law from an efficiency perspective, presenting a comprehensive analysis of these rules in a self-contained and rigorous yet accessible manner. It establishes general results on the efficiency of liability rules, including complete characterizations of efficient liability rules and efficient incremental liability rules. The book also establishes that the untaken precaution approach and decoupled liability are incompatible with efficiency.
The economic analysis of tort law has established that for efficiency it is necessary that each party to the interaction must be made to internalize the harm resulting from the interaction. The characterization and impossibility theorems presented in this book establish that, in addition to internalization of the harm by each party, there are two additional requirements for efficiency. Firstly, rules must be immune from strategic manipulation. Secondly, rules must entail closure with respect to the parties involved in the interaction giving rise to the negative externality, i.e., the liability must not be decoupled.
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À propos de l?auteur
Satish K. Jain is Professor at the Centre for Economic Studies and Planning, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi, India. He did his Master's in Economics from Delhi School of Economics, and Ph.D. from the University of Rochester, USA. His areas of interest are law and economics, and social choice theory.
Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
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Economic Analysis of Liability Rules
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Springer India, 2016
ISBN 10 : 8132235029
ISBN 13 : 9788132235026
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Economic Analysis of Liability Rules
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Etat : New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Presents a comprehensive analysis of liability rulesContains complete characterizations of efficient liability rules and efficient incremental liability rulesEstablishes that the untaken precaution approach as well as decoupled liability ar. N° de réf. du vendeur 385949132
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Economic Analysis of Liability Rules
Edité par
Springer India Aug 2016, 2016
ISBN 10 : 8132235029
ISBN 13 : 9788132235026
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Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -This book focuses on the analysis of liability rules of tort law from an efficiency perspective, presenting a comprehensive analysis of these rules in a self-contained and rigorous yet accessible manner. It establishes general results on the efficiency of liability rules, including complete characterizations of efficient liability rules and efficient incremental liability rules. The book also establishes that the untaken precaution approach and decoupled liability are incompatible with efficiency. The economic analysis of tort law has established that for efficiency it is necessary that each party to the interaction must be made to internalize the harm resulting from the interaction. The characterization and impossibility theorems presented in this book establish that, in addition to internalization of the harm by each party, there are two additional requirements for efficiency. Firstly, rules must be immune from strategic manipulation. Secondly, rules must entail closure with respect to the parties involved in the interaction giving rise to the negative externality, i.e., the liability must not be decoupled. 192 pp. Englisch. N° de réf. du vendeur 9788132235026
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Economic Analysis of Liability Rules
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Economic Analysis of Liability Rules
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Economic Analysis of Liability Rules
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Springer India, Springer India, 2016
ISBN 10 : 8132235029
ISBN 13 : 9788132235026
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Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This book focuses on the analysis of liability rules of tort law from an efficiency perspective, presenting a comprehensive analysis of these rules in a self-contained and rigorous yet accessible manner. It establishes general results on the efficiency of liability rules, including complete characterizations of efficient liability rules and efficient incremental liability rules. The book also establishes that the untaken precaution approach and decoupled liability are incompatible with efficiency. The economic analysis of tort law has established that for efficiency it is necessary that each party to the interaction must be made to internalize the harm resulting from the interaction. The characterization and impossibility theorems presented in this book establish that, in addition to internalization of the harm by each party, there are two additional requirements for efficiency. Firstly, rules must be immune from strategic manipulation. Secondly, rules must entail closure with respect to the parties involved in the interaction giving rise to the negative externality, i.e., the liability must not be decoupled. N° de réf. du vendeur 9788132235026
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Economic Analysis of Liability Rules
Edité par
Springer India, Springer India Aug 2016, 2016
ISBN 10 : 8132235029
ISBN 13 : 9788132235026
Neuf
Taschenbuch
Vendeur : buchversandmimpf2000, Emtmannsberg, BAYE, Allemagne
Évaluation du vendeur 5 sur 5 étoiles
Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. Neuware -This book focuses on the analysis of liability rules of tort law from an efficiency perspective, presenting a comprehensive analysis of these rules in a self-contained and rigorous yet accessible manner. It establishes general results on the efficiency of liability rules, including complete characterizations of efficient liability rules and efficient incremental liability rules. The book also establishes that the untaken precaution approach and decoupled liability are incompatible with efficiency.The economic analysis of tort law has established that for efficiency it is necessary that each party to the interaction must be made to internalize the harm resulting from the interaction. The characterization and impossibility theorems presented in this book establish that, in addition to internalization of the harm by each party, there are two additional requirements for efficiency. Firstly, rules must be immune from strategic manipulation. Secondly, rules must entail closure with respect to the parties involved in the interaction giving rise to the negative externality, i.e., the liability must not be decoupled.Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg 192 pp. Englisch. N° de réf. du vendeur 9788132235026
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Economic Analysis of Liability Rules
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Economic Analysis of Liability Rules
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