Stochastic Multiplayer Games: Theory and Algorithms - Couverture souple

Ummels, Michael

 
9789085550402: Stochastic Multiplayer Games: Theory and Algorithms
Couverture souple
ISBN 10 : 9085550408 ISBN 13 : 9789085550402
Editeur : Pallas Publications, 2010

Synopsis

Stochastic games provide a versatile model for reactive systems that are affected by random events. This dissertation advances the algorithmic theory of stochastic games to incorporate multiple players, whose objectives are not necessarily conflicting. The basis of this work is a comprehensive complexity theoretic analysis of the standard game-theoretic solution concepts in the context of stochastic games over a finite state space. One main result is that the constrained existence of a Nash equilibrium becomes undecidable in this setting. This impossibility result is accompanied by several positive results, including efficient algorithms for natural special cases.

Michael Ummels received his diploma degree in computer science from RWTH Aachen University. He started his doctoral studies at the same university in 2006, supervise by Prof. Dr. Erich Grädel and Prof. Dr. Dr.h.c. Wolfgang Thomas. As ofFebruary 2010, the author is a postdoctoral researcher at ENS Cachan.

Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.

À propos de l?auteur

Michael Ummels received his diploma degree in computer science from RWTH Aachen University. He started his doctoral studies at the same university in 2006, supervised by Prof. Dr. Erich Grädel and Prof. Dr. Dr.h.c. Wolfgang Thomas. As ofFebruary 2010, the author is a postdoctoral researcher at ENS Cachan.

À propos de la quatrième de couverture

Stochastic games provide a versatile model for reactive systems that are affected by random events. This dissertation advances the algorithmic theory of stochastic games to incorporate multiple players, whose objectives are not necessarily conflicting. The basis of this work is a comprehensive complexity theoretic analysis of the standard game-theoretic solution concepts in the context of stochastic games over a finite state space. One main result is that the constrained existence of a Nash equilibrium becomes undecidable in this setting. This impossibility result is accompanied by several positive results, including efficient algorithms for natural special cases.

Michael Ummels received his diploma degree in computer science from RWTH Aachen University. He started his doctoral studies at the same university in 2006, supervise by Prof. Dr. Erich Grädel and Prof. Dr. Dr.h.c. Wolfgang Thomas. As ofFebruary 2010, the author is a postdoctoral researcher at ENS Cachan.

Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.

Éditeur
Pallas Publications
Date d'édition
2010
Langue
anglais
ISBN 10 
9085550408
ISBN 13 
9789085550402
Reliure
Broché
Nombre de pages
174
Coordonnées du fabricant
non disponible
Personne responsable
non disponible