Melinda A. Roberts and David T. Wasserman 1 Purpose of this Collection What are our obligations with respect to persons who have not yet, and may not ever, come into existence? Few of us believe that we can wrong those whom we leave out of existence altogether—that is, merely possible persons. We may think as well that the directive to be “fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth” 1 does not hold up to close scrutiny. How can it be wrong to decline to bring ever more people into existence? At the same time, we think we are clearly ob- gated to treat future persons—persons who don’t yet but will exist—in accordance with certain stringent standards. Bringing a person into an existence that is truly awful—not worth having—can be wrong, and so can bringing a person into an existence that is worth having when we had the alternative of bringing that same person into an existence that is substantially better. We may think as well that our obligations with respect to future persons are triggered well before the point at which those persons commence their existence. We think it would be wrong, for example, to choose today to turn the Earth of the future into a miserable place even if the victims of that choice do not yet exist.
Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
This collection of essays, written by noted scholars and theorists, covers everything from the practical to the theoretical, and investigates the obligations we have to future persons, ranging from our own future offspring to distant future generations.
Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
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Kartoniert / Broschiert. Etat : New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Examines what we owe future persons from both moral and legal perspectivesDeeply probes particular concerns in areas ranging from the new reproductive technologies to the structure of moralityRanges from the practical (is it wrong to bring . N° de réf. du vendeur 5825949
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Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -Melinda A. Roberts and David T. Wasserman 1 Purpose of this Collection What are our obligations with respect to persons who have not yet, and may not ever, come into existence Few of us believe that we can wrong those whom we leave out of existence altogether-that is, merely possible persons. We may think as well that the directive to be 'fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth' 1 does not hold up to close scrutiny. How can it be wrong to decline to bring ever more people into existence At the same time, we think we are clearly ob- gated to treat future persons-persons who don't yet but will exist-in accordance with certain stringent standards. Bringing a person into an existence that is truly awful-not worth having-can be wrong, and so can bringing a person into an existence that is worth having when we had the alternative of bringing that same person into an existence that is substantially better. We may think as well that our obligations with respect to future persons are triggered well before the point at which those persons commence their existence. We think it would be wrong, for example, to choose today to turn the Earth of the future into a miserable place even if the victims of that choice do not yet exist. 388 pp. Englisch. N° de réf. du vendeur 9789400726048
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Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. Harming Future Persons | Ethics, Genetics and the Nonidentity Problem | Melinda A. Roberts (u. a.) | Taschenbuch | vii | Englisch | 2011 | Springer | EAN 9789400726048 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu. N° de réf. du vendeur 106695761
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Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Melinda A. Roberts and David T. Wasserman 1 Purpose of this Collection What are our obligations with respect to persons who have not yet, and may not ever, come into existence Few of us believe that we can wrong those whom we leave out of existence altogether-that is, merely possible persons. We may think as well that the directive to be 'fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth' 1 does not hold up to close scrutiny. How can it be wrong to decline to bring ever more people into existence At the same time, we think we are clearly ob- gated to treat future persons-persons who don't yet but will exist-in accordance with certain stringent standards. Bringing a person into an existence that is truly awful-not worth having-can be wrong, and so can bringing a person into an existence that is worth having when we had the alternative of bringing that same person into an existence that is substantially better. We may think as well that our obligations with respect to future persons are triggered well before the point at which those persons commence their existence. We think it would be wrong, for example, to choose today to turn the Earth of the future into a miserable place even if the victims of that choice do not yet exist. N° de réf. du vendeur 9789400726048
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Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -Melinda A. Roberts and David T. Wasserman 1 Purpose of this Collection What are our obligations with respect to persons who have not yet, and may not ever, come into existence Few of us believe that we can wrong those whom we leave out of existence altogether¿that is, merely possible persons. We may think as well that the directive to be ¿fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth¿ 1 does not hold up to close scrutiny. How can it be wrong to decline to bring ever more people into existence At the same time, we think we are clearly ob- gated to treat future persons¿persons who don¿t yet but will exist¿in accordance with certain stringent standards. Bringing a person into an existence that is truly awful¿not worth having¿can be wrong, and so can bringing a person into an existence that is worth having when we had the alternative of bringing that same person into an existence that is substantially better. We may think as well that our obligations with respect to future persons are triggered well before the point at which those persons commence their existence. We think it would be wrong, for example, to choose today to turn the Earth of the future into a miserable place even if the victims of that choice do not yet exist.Springer-Verlag KG, Sachsenplatz 4-6, 1201 Wien 388 pp. Englisch. N° de réf. du vendeur 9789400726048
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