Chilcot Report: Executive Summary
Chilcot, John; Freedman, Lawrence; Prashar, Usha Kumari; Lyne, Roderic; Gilbert, Martin
Langue : anglais
Edité par Canbury Press, 2016
- Livre broché
- Occasion
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Ajouter au panierN° de réf. du vendeur U9780995497801
- Titre
- Chilcot Report: Executive Summary
- Auteur
- Chilcot, John; Freedman, Lawrence; Prashar, Usha Kumari; Lyne, Roderic; Gilbert, Martin
- Éditeur
- Canbury Press
- Année de publication
- 2016
- État de l'article
- Very Good
- Jaquette
- 7703594
- Signé
- 6/1/2026 12:00:23 PM
- Reliure
- Couverture souple
- Langue
- anglais
- ISBN à 10 chiffres
- 099549780X
- ISBN à 13 chiffres
- 9780995497801
- Édition
- 1780315223.
- Catalogues du vendeur
- 1, 9780995497801, U
'It offers a long and painful account of an episode that may come to be seen as marking the moment when the UK fell off its global perch, trust in government collapsed and the country turned inward and began to disintegrate.' ― Philippe Sands, London Review of Books
Description
All the key findings of the public inquiry into the handling of the 2003 Iraq war by Tony Blair's government in a 60,000-word book.
Chaired by Sir John Chilcot, the Iraq Inquiry (known as the 'Chilcot Report') tackled:
- Saddam Hussein's threat to Britain
- the legal advice for the invasion
- intelligence about weapons of mass destruction and
- planning for a post-conflict Iraq.
The behaviour of the GCHQ whistleblower Katharine Gun and the controversy over whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruction was the subject of the film Official Secrets.
Contents
Introduction
Pre-conflict strategy and planning
The UK decision to support US military action. UK policy before 9/11; The impact of 9/11; Decision to take the UN route; Negotiation of resolution 1441; The prospect of military action; The gap between the Permanent Members of the Security Council widens; The end of the UN route
Why Iraq? Why now? Was Iraq a serious or imminent threat?; The predicted increase in the threat to the UK as a result of military action in Iraq
The UK’s relationship with the US
Decision-making. Collective responsibility
Advice on the legal basis for military action. The timing of Lord Goldsmith’s advice on the interpretation of resolution 1441; Goldsmith’s advice of 7 March 2003; Goldsmith’s arrival at a “better view”; The exchange of letters on 14 and 15 March 2003; Goldsmith’s Written Answer of 17 March 2003
Weapons of mass destruction. Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002; Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002; Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003; The search for WMD
Planning for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. The failure to plan or prepare for known risks; The planning process and decision-making
Occupation. Looting in Basra; Looting in Baghdad; UK influence on post-invasion strategy: resolution 1483; UK influence on the Coalition Provisional Authority; A decline in security; The turning point
Transition. UK influence on US strategy post-CPA; Planning for withdrawal; The impact of Afghanistan; Iraqiisation
Preparation for withdrawal. A major divergence in strategy; A possible civil war; Force Level Review; The beginning of the end
Did the UK achieve its objectives in Iraq?
- Key Findings 1. Development of UK strategy and options, 9/11 to early January 2002; Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 – “axis of evil” to Crawford; Development of UK strategy and options, April to July 2002
- Key Findings 2. Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January 2003; Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March 2003; Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002; Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002; Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003; WMD search
- Key Findings 3. Advice on the legal basis for military action, November 2002 to March 2003; Development of the military options for an invasion of Iraq; Military planning for the invasion, January to March 2003; Military equipment (pre-conflict); Planning for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq; Invasion
- Key Findings 4. The post-conflict period; Reconstruction; De-Ba’athification; Security Sector Reform; Resources; Military equipment (post-conflict); Civilian personnel; Service Personnel; Civilian casualties
Lessons. The decision to go to war; Weapons of mass destruction; The invasion of Iraq; The post-conflict period; Reconstruction; De-Ba’athification; Security Sector Reform; Resources; Military equipment (post-conflict); Civilian personnel
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Contents
Introduction
Pre-conflict strategy and planning
The UK decision to support US military action. UK policy before 9/11; The impact of 9/11; Decision to take the UN route; Negotiation of resolution 1441; The prospect of military action; The gap between the Permanent Members of the Security Council widens; The end of the UN route
Why Iraq? Why now? Was Iraq a serious or imminent threat?; The predicted increase in the threat to the UK as a result of military action in Iraq
The UK’s relationship with the US
Decision-making. Collective responsibility
Advice on the legal basis for military action. The timing of Lord Goldsmith’s advice on the interpretation of resolution 1441; Goldsmith’s advice of 7 March 2003; Goldsmith’s arrival at a “better view”; The exchange of letters on 14 and 15 March 2003; Goldsmith’s Written Answer of 17 March 2003
Weapons of mass destruction. Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002; Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002; Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003; The search for WMD
Planning for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. The failure to plan or prepare for known risks; The planning process and decision-making
Occupation. Looting in Basra; Looting in Baghdad; UK influence on post-invasion strategy: resolution 1483; UK influence on the Coalition Provisional Authority; A decline in security; The turning point
Transition. UK influence on US strategy post-CPA; Planning for withdrawal; The impact of Afghanistan; Iraqiisation
Preparation for withdrawal. A major divergence in strategy; A possible civil war; Force Level Review; The beginning of the end
Did the UK achieve its objectives in Iraq?
- Key Findings 1. Development of UK strategy and options, 9/11 to early January 2002; Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 – “axis of evil” to Crawford; Development of UK strategy and options, April to July 2002; Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 Sep 2002
- Key Findings 2. Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January 2003; Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March 2003; Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002; Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002; Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003; WMD search
- Key Findings 3. Advice on the legal basis for military action, November 2002 to March 2003; Development of the military options for an invasion of Iraq; Military planning for the invasion, January to March 2003; Military equipment (pre-conflict); Planning for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq; Invasion
- Key Findings 4. The post-conflict period; Reconstruction; De-Ba’athification; Security Sector Reform; Resources; Military equipment (post-conflict); Civilian personnel; Service Personnel; Civilian casualties
Lessons. The decision to go to war; Weapons of mass destruction; The invasion of Iraq; The post-conflict period; Reconstruction; De-Ba’athification; Security Sector Reform; Resources; Military equipment (post-conflict); Civilian personnel
Timeline of events
Extract
Introduction
1. In 2003, for the first time since the Second World War, the United Kingdom took part in an opposed invasion and full-scale occupation of a sovereign State – Iraq. Cabinet decided on 17 March to join the US-led invasion of Iraq, assuming there was no last-minute capitulation by Saddam Hussein. That decision was ratified by Parliament the next day and implemented the night after that.
2. Until 28 June 2004, the UK was a joint Occupying Power in Iraq. For the next five years, UK forces remained in Iraq with responsibility for security in the South-East; and the UK sought to assist with stabilisation and reconstruction.
3. The consequences of the invasion and of the conflict within Iraq which followed are still being felt in Iraq and the wider Middle East, as well as in the UK. It left families bereaved and many individuals wounded, mentally as well as physically. After harsh deprivation under Saddam Hussein’s regime, the Iraqi people suffered further years of violence.
4. The decision to use force – a very serious decision for any government to take – provoked profound controversy in relation to Iraq and became even more controversial when it was subsequently found that Iraq’s programmes to develop and produce chemical, biological and nuclear weapons had been dismantled. It continues to shape debates on national security policy and the circumstances in which to intervene.
5. Although the Coalition had achieved the removal of a brutal regime which had defied the United Nations and which was seen as a threat to peace and security, it failed to achieve the goals it had set for a new Iraq. Faced with serious disorder in Iraq, aggravated by sectarian differences, the US and UK struggled to contain the situation. The lack of security impeded political, social and economic reconstruction.
6. The Inquiry’s report sets out in detail decision-making in the UK Government covering the period from when the possibility of military action first arose in 2001 to the departure of UK troops in 2009. It covers many different aspects of policy and its delivery...
« Synopsis » peut appartenir à une autre édition de cet ouvrage.
À propos de l’auteur
The Iraq Inquiry was the public inquiry ordered by the British government into the UK's conduct before, during and after the Iraq war in 2003.
Named after its chairman Sir John Chilcot, a retired civil servant, the committee reported its findings on 6th July 2016.
The committee was set up by Gordon Brown, the then Prime Minister, in 2009, with the following members:
• Sir John Chilcot (chairman), a career diplomat and senior civil servant who was previously a member of the Butler Review
• Sir Lawrence Freedman, a military historian, and Professor of War Studies at King's College London.
• Sir Martin Gilbert (died 3 February 2015), a historian who supported the invasion of Iraq
• Sir Roderic Lyne, a former Ambassador to Russia and to the United Nations in Geneva
• Baroness Prashar, a crossbencher, member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights
« A propos de ce titre » peut appartenir à une autre édition de cet ouvrage.
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