Choices, Values, and Frames

ISBN 10: 0521627494 / ISBN 13: 9780521627498

Edité par Cambridge University Press, 2000

Former library copy. Pages intact with minimal writing/highlighting. The binding may be loose and creased. Dust jackets/supplements are not included. Includes library markings. Stock photo provided. Product includes identifying sticker. Better World Books: Buy Books. Do Good. N° de réf. du vendeur 5860138-6

Synopsis :

This book presents the definitive exposition of 'prospect theory', a compelling alternative to the classical utility theory of choice. Building on the 1982 volume, Judgement Under Uncertainty, this book brings together seminal papers on prospect theory from economists, decision theorists, and psychologists, including the work of the late Amos Tversky, whose contributions are collected here for the first time. While remaining within a rational choice framework, prospect theory delivers more accurate, empirically verified predictions in key test cases, as well as helping to explain many complex, real-world puzzles. In this volume, it is brought to bear on phenomena as diverse as the principles of legal compensation, the equity premium puzzle in financial markets, and the number of hours that New York cab drivers choose to drive on rainy days. Theoretically elegant and empirically robust, this volume shows how prospect theory has matured into a new science of decision making.

Revue de presse: ' ... full of great articles, including many of the most important ever written about decision research ... More than compensating for any shortcomings is a fascinating and moving introduction written by Kahneman about his collaboration with Tversky. This is inspiring stuff. Even if you already have most of the articles from the book in your file drawer, it is worth getting just for this introduction.' Journal of Behavioural Decision Making

Détails bibliographiques

Titre : Choices, Values, and Frames
Éditeur : Cambridge University Press
Date d'édition : 2000
Reliure : Couverture souple
Etat : Good