Contingent Future Persons

J. C. Heller

ISBN 10: 0792347072 / ISBN 13: 9780792347071

Edité par Springer Netherlands Aug 1997, 1997

A propos de cet article

This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -How ought we evaluate the individual and collective actions on which the existence, numbers and identities of future people depend In the briefest of terms, this question poses what is addressed here as the problem of contingent future persons, and as such it poses relatively novel challenges for philosophical and theological ethicists. For though it may be counter-intuitive, it seems that those contingent future persons who are actually brought into existence by such actions cannot benefit from or be harmed by these actions in any conventional sense of the terms. This intriguing problem was defined almost three decades ago by Jan Narveson [2], and to date its implications have been explored most exhaustively by Derek Parfit [3] and David Heyd [1]. Nevertheless, as yet there is simply no consensus on how we ought to evaluate such actions or, indeed, on whether we can. Still, the pursuit of a solution to the problem has been interestingly employed by moral philosophers to press the limits of ethics and to urge a reconsideration of the nature and source of value at its most fundamental level. It is thus proving to be a very fruitful investigation, with far-reaching theoretical and practical implications. 228 pp. Englisch.

N° de réf. du vendeur 9780792347071

Détails bibliographiques

• Titre: Contingent Future Persons
• Éditeur: Springer Netherlands Aug 1997
• Date de parution: 1997
• Langue: anglais
• ISBN à 10 chiffres: 0792347072
• ISBN à 13 chiffres: 9780792347071
• Reliure: Buch
• État de l'article: Neu
• Dimensions: 241 L x 160 H x 17 P (en millimètres) 241 millimètres de largeur par 160 millimètres de hauteur par 17 millimètres de profondeur
• Poids: 512 grammes

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Synopsis

How ought we evaluate the individual and collective actions on which the existence, numbers and identities of future people depend? In the briefest of terms, this question poses what is addressed here as the problem of contingent future persons, and as such it poses relatively novel challenges for philosophical and theological ethicists. For though it may be counter-intuitive, it seems that those contingent future persons who are actually brought into existence by such actions cannot benefit from or be harmed by these actions in any conventional sense of the terms. This intriguing problem was defined almost three decades ago by Jan Narveson [2], and to date its implications have been explored most exhaustively by Derek Parfit [3] and David Heyd [1]. Nevertheless, as yet there is simply no consensus on how we ought to evaluate such actions or, indeed, on whether we can. Still, the pursuit of a solution to the problem has been interestingly employed by moral philosophers to press the limits of ethics and to urge a reconsideration of the nature and source of value at its most fundamental level. It is thus proving to be a very fruitful investigation, with far-reaching theoretical and practical implications.