Epistemic Angst : Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing

Duncan Pritchard

ISBN 10: 0691183430 / ISBN 13: 9780691183435

Edité par Princeton University Press Jan 2019, 2019

A propos de cet article

Neuware - Epistemic Angst offers a completely new solution to the ancient philosophical problem of radical skepticism-the challenge of explaining how it is possible to have knowledge of a world external to us.Duncan Pritchard argues that the key to resolving this puzzle is to realize that it is composed of two logically distinct problems, each requiring its own solution. He then puts forward solutions to both problems. To that end, he offers a new reading of Wittgenstein's account of the structure of rational evaluation and demonstrates how this provides an elegant solution to one aspect of the skeptical problem. Pritchard also revisits the epistemological disjunctivist proposal that he developed in previous work and shows how it can effectively handle the other aspect of the problem. Finally, he argues that these two antiskeptical positions, while superficially in tension with each other, are not only compatible but also mutually supporting.The result is a comprehensive and distinctive resolution to the problem of radical skepticism, one that challenges many assumptions in contemporary epistemology.

N° de réf. du vendeur 9780691183435

Détails bibliographiques

• Titre: Epistemic Angst : Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing
• Éditeur: Princeton University Press Jan 2019
• Date de parution: 2019
• Langue: anglais
• ISBN à 10 chiffres: 0691183430
• ISBN à 13 chiffres: 9780691183435
• Reliure: Taschenbuch
• État de l'article: Neu
• Dimensions: 233 L x 156 H x 21 P (en millimètres) 233 millimètres de largeur par 156 millimètres de hauteur par 21 millimètres de profondeur
• Poids: 419 grammes

A propos de ce titre

Synopsis

Epistemic Angst offers a completely new solution to the ancient philosophical problem of radical skepticism-the challenge of explaining how it is possible to have knowledge of a world external to us.

Duncan Pritchard argues that the key to resolving this puzzle is to realize that it is composed of two logically distinct problems, each requiring its own solution. He then puts forward solutions to both problems. To that end, he offers a new reading of Wittgenstein's account of the structure of rational evaluation and demonstrates how this provides an elegant solution to one aspect of the skeptical problem. Pritchard also revisits the epistemological disjunctivist proposal that he developed in previous work and shows how it can effectively handle the other aspect of the problem. Finally, he argues that these two antiskeptical positions, while superficially in tension with each other, are not only compatible but also mutually supporting.

The result is a comprehensive and distinctive resolution to the problem of radical skepticism, one that challenges many assumptions in contemporary epistemology.

À propos de l?auteur

Duncan Pritchard is professor of philosophy at the University of Edinburgh, where he is the director of Eidyn: The Edinburgh Centre for Epistemology, Mind and Normativity. His books include Epistemic Luck and Epistemological Disjunctivism.