Fixed Point Theorems with Applications to Economics and Game Theory par Kim C. Border Border Kim C.: New (1989)

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pp. 140 2:B&W 6 x 9 in or 229 x 152 mm Perfect Bound on Creme w/Gloss Lam.

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Titre: Fixed Point Theorems with Applications to Economics and Game Theory
�diteur: Cambridge University Press
Date de parution: 1989
Langue: anglais
ISBN � 10 chiffres: 0521388082
ISBN � 13 chiffres: 9780521388085
Reliure: Couverture souple
�tat de l'article: New

A propos de ce titre

Synopsis

One of the problems in economics that economists have devoted a considerable amount of attention in prevalent years has been to ensure consistency in the models they employ. Assuming markets to be generally in some state of equilibrium, it is asked under what circumstances such equilibrium is possible. The fundamental mathematical tools used to address this concern are fixed point theorems: the conditions under which sets of assumptions have a solution. This book gives the reader access to the mathematical techniques involved and goes on to apply fixed point theorems to proving the existence of equilibria for economics and for co-operative and noncooperative games. Special emphasis is given to economics and games in cases where the preferences of agents may not be transitive. The author presents topical proofs of old results in order to further clarify the results. He also proposes fresh results, notably in the last chapter, that refer to the core of a game without transitivity. This book will be useful as a text or reference work for mathematical economists and graduate and advanced undergraduate students.

Pr�sentation de l'�diteur

One of the problems in economics that economists have devoted a considerable amount of attention in prevalent years has been to ensure consistency in the models they employ. Assuming markets to be generally in some state of equilibrium, it is asked under what circumstances such equilibrium is possible. The fundamental mathematical tools used to address this concern are fixed point theorems: the conditions under which sets of assumptions have a solution. This book gives the reader access to the mathematical techniques involved and goes on to apply fixed point theorems to proving the existence of equilibria for economics and for co-operative and noncooperative games. Special emphasis is given to economics and games in cases where the preferences of agents may not be transitive. The author presents topical proofs of old results in order to further clarify the results. He also proposes fresh results, notably in the last chapter, that refer to the core of a game without transitivity. This book will be useful as a text or reference work for mathematical economists and graduate and advanced undergraduate students.

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