Game Equilibrium Models II | Methods, Morals, and Markets

Reinhard Selten

ISBN 10: 3642081096 ISBN 13: 9783642081095

Edit� par Springer-Verlag GmbH, 2010

impression � la demande

Neuf(s) Taschenbuch

Vendeur preigu, Osnabr�ck, Allemagne �valuation du vendeur 5 sur 5 �toiles

Vendeur AbeBooks depuis 5 ao�t 2024

Cet article sp�cifique n'est plus disponible.

Afficher tous les articles du vendeur Cr�er une demande de livres portant sur des articles similaires

Afficher tous les exemplaires de ce livre

A propos de cet article

Signaler cet article

Synopsis :

The four volumes Game Equilibrium Models contain the results of an interdisciplinary research group on non-cooperative game theory. Volume II is mainly of interest for economists.

Les informations fournies dans la section � A propos du livre � peuvent faire r�f�rence � une autre �dition de ce titre.

D�tails bibliographiques

Titre : Game Equilibrium Models II | Methods, Morals...
�diteur : Springer-Verlag GmbH
Date d'�dition : 2010
Reliure : Taschenbuch
Etat : Neu

Meilleurs r�sultats de recherche sur AbeBooks

Image fournie par le vendeur

Game Equilibrium Models II

Edit� par Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010

ISBN 10 : 3642081096 ISBN 13 : 9783642081095

Neuf Couverture souple

Vendeur : moluna, Greven, Allemagne

�valuation du vendeur 4 sur 5 �toiles

Etat : New. N� de r�f. du vendeur 5047156

Contacter le vendeur

Acheter neuf

EUR 92,27

Exp�dition �EUR 48,99
Exp�dition depuis Allemagne vers Etats-Unis

Quantit� disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles

Ajouter au panier

Image d'archives

Game Equilibrium Models II: Methods, Morals, and Markets

Edit� par Springer, 2010

ISBN 10 : 3642081096 ISBN 13 : 9783642081095

Neuf Couverture souple

Vendeur : Lucky's Textbooks, Dallas, TX, Etats-Unis

�valuation du vendeur 5 sur 5 �toiles

Etat : New. N� de r�f. du vendeur ABLIING23Mar3113020216811

Contacter le vendeur

Acheter neuf

EUR 103,35

Exp�dition �EUR 3,44
Exp�dition nationale�: Etats-Unis

Quantit� disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles

Ajouter au panier

Image fournie par le vendeur

Game Equilibrium Models II : Methods, Morals, and Markets

Selten, Reinhard (EDT); Abreu, D. (CON); Albers, W. (CON); Binmore, K. (CON); Gardner, R. (CON)

Edit� par Springer, 2010

ISBN 10 : 3642081096 ISBN 13 : 9783642081095

Neuf Couverture souple

Vendeur : GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, Etats-Unis

�valuation du vendeur 5 sur 5 �toiles

Etat : New. N� de r�f. du vendeur 12033784-n

Contacter le vendeur

Acheter neuf

EUR 104,54

Exp�dition �EUR 2,27
Exp�dition nationale�: Etats-Unis

Quantit� disponible : 15 disponible(s)

Ajouter au panier

Image fournie par le vendeur

Game Equilibrium Models II

Reinhard Selten

Edit� par Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Springer Berlin Heidelberg Dez 2010, 2010

ISBN 10 : 3642081096 ISBN 13 : 9783642081095

Neuf Taschenbuch

Vendeur : buchversandmimpf2000, Emtmannsberg, BAYE, Allemagne

�valuation du vendeur 5 sur 5 �toiles

Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. Neuware -This paper represents the collaborative work of a game theorist and a policy analyst in an attempt to examine severa! questions that go to the hearl of the way individuala achieve social order. The capacity of any individual to undertake long-term, productive activities that affect and are affected by the actiona of other individuala dependa upon gaining a minimallevel of predictability among those involved. No one could successfully drive to work if the behavior of other drivera were noi relatively predictable. No one could operate a stare, if potential consumers did not purcha. se, rather than stea!, the commodities offered to the public. No one would ma. ke a. ny investments other than those tha. t would be made by a solitary individual in an isolated setting (the cla. ssic Robinson Crusoe situation). One of the ways that individuals achieve predictability in social arrangements is to a. gree to follow a set of normative prescriptions a. bout what they must, must not, or may do. Agreeing to a set of prescriptions is relatively easy. Actually following those prescriptions over time when temptations arise offering potentially high payoffs, is not at all easy. In natural settings, individUala follow agreed upon prescriptions to a greater or lesser extent depending on enforcement levels. A frequent assumption made by policy ana. lysts a. nd game theorists is tha. t enforcement is externa! to the situa. tion under analysis. That a.Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg 384 pp. Englisch. N� de r�f. du vendeur 9783642081095

Contacter le vendeur

Acheter neuf

EUR 106,99

Exp�dition �EUR 60
Exp�dition depuis Allemagne vers Etats-Unis

Quantit� disponible : 2 disponible(s)

Ajouter au panier

Image fournie par le vendeur

Game Equilibrium Models II : Methods, Morals, and Markets

Reinhard Selten

Edit� par Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010

ISBN 10 : 3642081096 ISBN 13 : 9783642081095

Neuf Taschenbuch

Vendeur : AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Allemagne

�valuation du vendeur 5 sur 5 �toiles

Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This paper represents the collaborative work of a game theorist and a policy analyst in an attempt to examine severa! questions that go to the hearl of the way individuala achieve social order. The capacity of any individual to undertake long-term, productive activities that affect and are affected by the actiona of other individuala dependa upon gaining a minimallevel of predictability among those involved. No one could successfully drive to work if the behavior of other drivera were noi relatively predictable. No one could operate a stare, if potential consumers did not purcha. se, rather than stea!, the commodities offered to the public. No one would ma. ke a. ny investments other than those tha. t would be made by a solitary individual in an isolated setting (the cla. ssic Robinson Crusoe situation). One of the ways that individuals achieve predictability in social arrangements is to a. gree to follow a set of normative prescriptions a. bout what they must, must not, or may do. Agreeing to a set of prescriptions is relatively easy. Actually following those prescriptions over time when temptations arise offering potentially high payoffs, is not at all easy. In natural settings, individUala follow agreed upon prescriptions to a greater or lesser extent depending on enforcement levels. A frequent assumption made by policy ana. lysts a. nd game theorists is tha. t enforcement is externa! to the situa. tion under analysis. That a. N� de r�f. du vendeur 9783642081095

Contacter le vendeur

Acheter neuf

EUR 106,99

Exp�dition �EUR 62,91
Exp�dition depuis Allemagne vers Etats-Unis

Quantit� disponible : 1 disponible(s)

Ajouter au panier

Image fournie par le vendeur

Game Equilibrium Models II

Reinhard Selten

Edit� par Springer Berlin Heidelberg Dez 2010, 2010

ISBN 10 : 3642081096 ISBN 13 : 9783642081095

Neuf Taschenbuch

impression � la demande

Vendeur : BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K., Bergisch Gladbach, Allemagne

�valuation du vendeur 5 sur 5 �toiles

Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -This paper represents the collaborative work of a game theorist and a policy analyst in an attempt to examine severa! questions that go to the hearl of the way individuala achieve social order. The capacity of any individual to undertake long-term, productive activities that affect and are affected by the actiona of other individuala dependa upon gaining a minimallevel of predictability among those involved. No one could successfully drive to work if the behavior of other drivera were noi relatively predictable. No one could operate a stare, if potential consumers did not purcha. se, rather than stea!, the commodities offered to the public. No one would ma. ke a. ny investments other than those tha. t would be made by a solitary individual in an isolated setting (the cla. ssic Robinson Crusoe situation). One of the ways that individuals achieve predictability in social arrangements is to a. gree to follow a set of normative prescriptions a. bout what they must, must not, or may do. Agreeing to a set of prescriptions is relatively easy. Actually following those prescriptions over time when temptations arise offering potentially high payoffs, is not at all easy. In natural settings, individUala follow agreed upon prescriptions to a greater or lesser extent depending on enforcement levels. A frequent assumption made by policy ana. lysts a. nd game theorists is tha. t enforcement is externa! to the situa. tion under analysis. That a. 384 pp. Englisch. N� de r�f. du vendeur 9783642081095

Contacter le vendeur