The new edition of this textbook includes two new chapters on game theory and a revised introduction explaining what has happened in the field since 1989. The text continues to reflect the importance in economic research of non-cooperative game theory and information economics. Eric Rasmussen relies, wherever possible, on explanation in place of technical proofs. This book should be useful for advanced microeconomics courses and for anyone who needs to understand the economic research of the last ten years.
Widely praised when the first edition appeared,
Games and Information has been substantially enlarged and updated in the second edition. The text continues to reflect the importance in economic research of non–cooperative game theory and information economics. The topics of non–cooperative games and entry deterrence have been given their own chapters added on auditing, nuisance suits, recoordination and renegotiation, super moduality, signal jamming, market microstructure and government procurement. Many new chapters have been added and the number of homework problems has been greatly expanded.
Eric Rasmusen writes in a crisp and approachable style, relying wherever possible on explanation in place of technical proofs. The book will be an indispensable tool for advanced microeconomics courses and of considerable interest to anyone who needs to understand the economic research of the last ten years.