This textbook reflects the increasing importance in economic research and teaching of the non-cooperative game theory and information economics. Eric Rasmusen begins by laying out the theory of non-cooperative games from a user's viewpoint, introducing definitions and technical results only in so far as they are useful to the student or applied modeller. The book goes on to outline the basic models of incomplete information used in current economic research. The second and larger part of the book is devoted to applications of game theory, presenting many models which have so far been available only in widely dispersed sources. Individual chapters concentrate on auctions, moral hazard, adverse selection, signalling, reputation, bargaining and oligopoly. This text is designed for US microeconomics graduates, UK third year and graduates in microeconomics, specialists in the game theory and information economics, sociologists, and scientists of politics and law.
What may be the most successful introductory game theory textbook ever written is now available in its fourth edition. Since it first published in 1989, successive editions have made its presentation ever more elegant, with incisive problem sets and applications.
Written in a crisp and approachable style, Games and Information, 4e uses simple modeling techniques and straightforward explanations to provide students with an understanding of game theory and information economics. The fourth edition brings this material completely up–to–date, adds new end–of–chapter problems and classroom games, and is accompanied by a comprehensive website, featuring problem solutions and teaching notes: www.rasmusen.org/GI.
With its emphasis on applications of game theory and information economics to a vast array of disciplines, Games and Information, 4e provides an accessible first course for students in backgrounds as diverse as economics, business, mathematics, and political science.