Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design

ISBN 10: 1107135346 / ISBN 13: 9781107135345

Edité par Cambridge University Press, 2017

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Détails bibliographiques

• Titre: Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design
• Éditeur: Cambridge University Press
• Date de parution: 2017
• Langue: anglais
• ISBN à 10 chiffres: 1107135346
• ISBN à 13 chiffres: 9781107135345
• Reliure: Couverture rigide
• État de l'article: Neuf

A propos de ce titre

Synopsis

An international team of experts covers the pros and cons of different auction formats and lessons learned in the field.

À propos des auteurs

Martin Bichler is Professor of Informatics at the Technische Universität München (TUM), and a faculty member at the TUM School of Management. He is known for his academic work on market design, and he has acted as a consultant for private and public organizations including regulators, telecoms, and procurement organizations. Projects in which he is involved include the design of auctions for industrial procurement, logistics, advertising, fishery access rights, and spectrum sales. His research addresses algorithmic, game-theoretical, and behavioral questions and has appeared in leading journals in computer science, economics, operations research, and management science. He is currently Editor of Business and Information Systems Engineering and serves on the editorial boards of several academic journals.

Jacob Goeree is SHARP Professor and Director of the AGORA Center for Market Design at University of New South Wales, Sydney. He is a world-leading experimenter, theorist and market designer whose research has influenced the design of spectrum auctions and markets for pollution permits and fishing shares. Goeree was Research Fellow of the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and is Fellow of the Econometric Society and the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences. He served as President of the Economic Science Association and as Editor of Experimental Economics. He is an Associate Editor of the Journal of Economic Theory and Games and Economic Behavior.