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Former library book; Pages can have notes/highlighting. Spine may show signs of wear. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less 0.35. N° de réf. du vendeur G019505072XI3N10
This monograph purports to provide a solution to semantical paradoxes like the Liar. The authors base this solution on J. L. Austin's idea of truth, which is fundamental to situation semantics. They compare two models of language, propositions and truth, one based on Russell and the other on Austin, as they bear on the Liar Paradox. In Russell's view, a sentence expresses a proposition, which is true or not. According to Austin, however, there is always a contextual parameter - the situation the sentence is about - that comes between the sentence and proposition. The Austinian perspective proves to have fruitful applications to the analysis of semantic paradox. The authors show that, on this account, the liar is a genuine diagonal argument. This argument can be shown to have profound consequences for our understanding of some of the most basic semantical mechanisms at work in our language. Jon Barwise is, with John Perry, a co-founder of the Centre for the Study of Language and Information at Stanford. Mathematical and philosophical logicians, philosophers of language, linguists and computer scientists; those with an interest in artificial intelligence.
Présentation de l'éditeur: This monograph purports to provide a solution to semantical paradoxes like the Liar. The authors base this solution on J. L. Austin's idea of truth, which is fundamental to situation semantics. They compare two models of language, propositions and truth, one based on Russell and the other on Austin, as they bear on the Liar Paradox. In Russell's view, a sentence expresses a proposition, which is true or not. According to Austin, however, there is always a contextual parameter - the situation the sentence is about - that comes between the sentence and proposition. The Austinian perspective proves to have fruitful applications to the analysis of semantic paradox. The authors show that, on this account, the liar is a genuine diagonal argument. This argument can be shown to have profound consequences for our understanding of some of the most basic semantical mechanisms at work in our language. Jon Barwise is, with John Perry, a co-founder of the Centre for the Study of Language and Information at Stanford.
Titre : The Liar: An Essay on Truth and Circularity
Éditeur : Oxford University Press
Date d'édition : 1987
Reliure : Hardcover
Etat : Good
Etat de la jaquette : No Jacket
Vendeur : Better World Books, Mishawaka, IN, Etats-Unis
Etat : Good. First Edition. Former library book; may include library markings. Used book that is in clean, average condition without any missing pages. N° de réf. du vendeur GRP102794169
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Miki Store, San Jose, CA, Etats-Unis
hardcover. Etat : Good. Etat de la jaquette : NO DUST JACKET. Pages are crisp and clean, no marking. Cover is good. Binding is tight/good. NO DUST JACKET. ex-library book with normal library stamps & stickers. N° de réf. du vendeur ka-bs28
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Ted Kottler, Bookseller, Redondo Beach, CA, Etats-Unis
Hardcover. Etat : Fine. Etat de la jaquette : Fine. 1st Edition. xii, 185 pp. Original cloth. Near Fine, in near fine dust jacket. 'Jon Barwise and John Etchemendy propose that the liar sentence (which they interpret as synonymous with the Strengthened Liar) is ambiguous. They base this conclusion on a distinction they make between a 'denial' and a 'negation'. If the liar means 'It is not the case that this statement is true' then it is denying itself. If it means 'This statement is not true' then it is negating itself. They go on to argue, based on their theory of 'situational semantics', that the 'denial liar' can be true without contradiction while the 'negation liar' can be false without contradiction' ('Liar Paradox' entry on Wikipedia). N° de réf. du vendeur 18070
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)