The Myth and Reality of German Warfare: Operational Thinking from Moltke the Elder to Heusinger. Cet article n’est pas disponible.
Langue : anglais
Edité par The University Press of Kentucky, 2016
- Livre relié
- Neuf

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- Titre
- The Myth and Reality of German Warfare: Operational Thinking from Moltke the Elder to Heusinger
- Auteur
- Gerhard P. Gross
- Éditeur
- The University Press of Kentucky
- Année de publication
- 2016
- État de l'article
- New
- Reliure
- Hardback
- Langue
- anglais
- ISBN à 10 chiffres
- 0813168376
- ISBN à 13 chiffres
- 9780813168371
- Poids de l'article
- 824 grammes
- Série
- Livre 11 sur 18: Foreign Military Studies
Surrounded by potential adversaries, nineteenth-century Prussia and twentieth-century Germany faced the formidable prospect of multifront wars and wars of attrition. To counteract these threats, generations of general staff officers were educated in operational thinking, the main tenets of which were extremely influential on military planning across the globe and were adopted by American and Soviet armies. In the twentieth century, Germany's art of warfare dominated military theory and practice, creating a myth of German operational brilliance that lingers today, despite the nation's crushing defeats in two world wars.
In this seminal study, Gerhard P. Gross provides a comprehensive examination of the development and failure of German operational thinking over a period of more than a century. He analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of five different armies, from the mid--nineteenth century through the early days of NATO. He also offers fresh interpretations of towering figures of German military history, including Moltke the Elder, Alfred von Schlieffen, and Erich Ludendorff. Essential reading for military historians and strategists, this innovative work dismantles cherished myths and offers new insights into Germany's failed attempts to become a global power through military means.
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À propos de l’auteur
Major General David T. Zabecki, AUS (Ret.), is the author of The German 1918 Offensives: A Case Study in the Operational Level of War and editor emeritus of Vietnam magazine. He holds the Shifrin Distinguished Chair in Military and Naval History at the United States Naval Academy and is also an Honorary Senior Research Fellow in the War Studies Programme at the University of Birmingham (United Kingdom).
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