The Social Viability of Money : Competitive Equilibria and the Core of Overlapping Generations Economies

Joan Esteban

ISBN 10: 3540546499 / ISBN 13: 9783540546498

Edité par Springer, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1991

A propos de cet article

Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - In this book overlapping generations economies are analysedfrom a game theoretical point of view and the socialacceptability of consumption allocations is studied ininfinite horizon models of pure exchange economieswithagents with finite lifetimes who behave cooperatively. Thecore of such economies and its relation with competitiveequilibria, both walrasian and monetary and the essentialcharacteristics of the overlapping generations model areexamined.The author defines the problem of trust in intertemporalconsumption allocations as a question of belonging or not tothe core of economy and provides a full characterization ofthe core allocations for n-goods pure exchange economieswith one agent per generation: a consumption allocationbelongs to the core if and only it is Pareto optimal andSequentially Individually Rational. From this it followsthat for one commodity economies no consumption allocationinvolving intertemporal transfers can belong to the core ofthe economy. In other words, no monetary equilibrium issocially viable. This result is no longer true for manygoods models. For that case it is demonstrated that thereexist bounds on the real value of equilibrium moneypurchases beyond which monetary equilibria are not sociallyviableand with many agents in every generation it is shownthat as the economy becomes large and monetary (as well asIOU) equilibria become eventually excluded from the core ofthe economy. These results provide an analytical rationalefor the fact that in most countries fiat money is legaltender.

N° de réf. du vendeur 9783540546498

Détails bibliographiques

• Titre: The Social Viability of Money : Competitive Equilibria and the Core of Overlapping Generations Economies
• Éditeur: Springer, Springer Berlin Heidelberg
• Date de parution: 1991
• Langue: anglais
• ISBN à 10 chiffres: 3540546499
• ISBN à 13 chiffres: 9783540546498
• Reliure: Taschenbuch
• État de l'article: Neu
• Dimensions: 244 L x 170 H x 13 P (en millimètres) 244 millimètres de largeur par 170 millimètres de hauteur par 13 millimètres de profondeur
• Poids: 389 grammes

A propos de ce titre

Synopsis

In this book overlapping generations economies are analysed from a game theoretical point of view and the social acceptability of consumption allocations is studied in infinite horizon models of pure exchange economieswith agents with finite lifetimes who behave cooperatively. The core of such economies and its relation with competitive equilibria, both walrasian and monetary and the essential characteristics of the overlapping generations model are examined. The author defines the problem of trust in intertemporal consumption allocations as a question of belonging or not to the core of economy and provides a full characterization of the core allocations for n-goods pure exchange economies with one agent per generation: a consumption allocation belongs to the core if and only it is Pareto optimal and Sequentially Individually Rational. From this it follows that for one commodity economies no consumption allocation involving intertemporal transfers can belong to the core of the economy. In other words, no monetary equilibrium is socially viable. This result is no longer true for many goods models. For that case it is demonstrated that there exist bounds on the real value of equilibrium money purchases beyond which monetary equilibria are not socially viableand with many agents in every generation it is shown that as the economy becomes large and monetary (as well as IOU) equilibria become eventually excluded from the core of the economy. These results provide an analytical rationale for the fact that in most countries fiat money is legal tender.