In Uncertain Times : American Foreign Policy after the Berlin Wall and 9/11

Melvyn P. Leffler

ISBN 10: 0801476194 / ISBN 13: 9780801476198

Edité par Cornell University Press Apr 2011, 2011

A propos de cet article

Neuware - 'Published in association with the University of Virginia's Miller Center of Public Affairs.'.

N° de réf. du vendeur 9780801476198

Détails bibliographiques

• Titre: In Uncertain Times : American Foreign Policy after the Berlin Wall and 9/11
• Éditeur: Cornell University Press Apr 2011
• Date de parution: 2011
• Langue: anglais
• ISBN à 10 chiffres: 0801476194
• ISBN à 13 chiffres: 9780801476198
• Reliure: Taschenbuch
• État de l'article: Neu
• Dimensions: 234 L x 157 H x 17 P (en millimètres) 234 millimètres de largeur par 157 millimètres de hauteur par 17 millimètres de profondeur
• Poids: 388 grammes

A propos de ce titre

Synopsis

In Uncertain Times considers how policymakers react to dramatic developments on the world stage. Few expected the Berlin Wall to come down in November 1989; no one anticipated the devastating attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in September 2001. American foreign policy had to adjust quickly to an international arena that was completely transformed.

Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey W. Legro have assembled an illustrious roster of officials from the George H. W. Bush, Clinton, and George W. Bush administrations--Robert B. Zoellick, Paul Wolfowitz, Eric S. Edelman, Walter B. Slocombe, and Philip Zelikow. These policymakers describe how they went about making strategy for a world fraught with possibility and peril. They offer provocative reinterpretations of the economic strategy advanced by the George H. W. Bush administration, the bureaucratic clashes over policy toward the breakup of the USSR, the creation of the Defense Policy Guidance of 1992, the expansion of NATO, the writing of the National Security Strategy Statement of 2002, and the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

A group of eminent scholars address these same topics. Bruce Cumings, John Mueller, Mary Elise Sarotte, Odd Arne Westad, and William C. Wohlforth probe the unstated assumptions, the cultural values, and the psychological makeup of the policymakers. They examine whether opportunities were seized and whether threats were magnified and distorted. They assess whether academicians and independent experts would have done a better job than the policymakers did. Together, policymakers and scholars impel us to rethink how our world has changed and how policy can be improved in the future.

Contributors: Bruce Cumings, University of Chicago; Eric S. Edelman, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; Melvyn P. Leffler, University of Virginia; Jeffrey W. Legro, University of Virginia; John Mueller, Ohio State University; Mary Elise Sarotte, University of Southern California; Walter B. Slocombe, Council on Foreign Relations and Caplin & Drysdale; Odd Arne Westad, London School of Economics and Political Science; William C. Wohlforth, Dartmouth College; Paul Wolfowitz, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research; Philip Zelikow, University of Virginia; Robert B. Zoellick, World Bank Group

À propos de l?auteur

Melvyn P. Leffler is Edward R. Stettinius Professor of American History in the Department of History at the University of Virginia. He is the author of many books, including A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War and For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War. Jeffrey W. Legro is Randolph P. Compton Professor in the Department of Politics at the University of Virginia. He is the author of Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order and Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War II, both from Cornell. Leffler and Legro are also coeditors of To Lead the World: American Strategy after the Bush Doctrine.