My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope

Bremer, L. Paul, III, with McConnell, Malcolm

ISBN 10: 0743273893 / ISBN 13: 9780743273893

Edité par Simon & Schuster, New York, 2006

A propos de cet article

[12], 417, [3] pages. Illustrations. Map. Index. Inscribed by the author on the title page. The inscription reads To Jeff with my deep appreciation for your great service to our country. L. Paul Bremer 1/13/06. The author was America's proconsul in Iraq in the fourteen months following the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime. Lewis Paul Bremer III (born September 30, 1941) is a retired American diplomat. He was the second de facto chief civilian administrator of Iraq as leader of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) following the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States, from May 2003 until June 2004. He joined the Foreign Service, which sent him to Kabul, Afghanistan, as a general services officer. Bremer held various domestic posts with the U.S. State Department, including one as an assistant to Kissinger from 1972 to 1976. He was with Kissinger on shuttle diplomacy missions to Israel, Syria, and Egypt to resolve the Yom Kippur War in 1973 In vivid, dramatic detail, Bremer reveals the previously hidden struggles among Iraqi politicians and America's leaders, taking us from the ancient lanes of the holy city of Najaf to the White House Situation Room and the Pentagon E-Ring. Bremer arrived in Iraq in May 2003. On May 11 he replaced Lt. General Jay Garner as Director of the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance. In June, the Office was transformed into the Coalition Provisional Authority, and Bremer became the country's chief executive authority. As the holder of the "most powerful foreign post held by any American since Gen. Douglas MacArthur in Japan," he compared himself to MacArthur as well as General Lucius Clay, who was in charge of the American zone in Germany following its defeat in World War II. As the top civilian administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Bremer was permitted to rule by decree. Among his first and most notable decrees were Coalition Provisional Authority Order 1, which banned the Ba'ath party in all forms, and Coalition Provisional Authority Order 2, which dismantled the Iraqi Army. On July 13, 2003, Bremer approved the creation of an Iraqi Interim Governing Council with the stated mission of "ensuring that the Iraqi people's interests are represented." The council members were chosen by Bremer from among groups and individuals which had supported the American invasion of Iraq. Bremer retained veto power over the council's proposals. The council was authorized to select a limited number of delegates to key Coalition Provisional Authority committees, like the Program Review Board. Bremer also empowered the CPA to develop and implement the Iraqi constitution. On June 28, 2004, at 10:26 am local time, the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority formally transferred limited sovereignty of Iraqi territory to the Iraqi Interim Government, two days ahead of schedule. Bremer departed from the country on the same day.

N° de réf. du vendeur 57251

Détails bibliographiques

• Titre: My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope
• Éditeur: Simon & Schuster, New York
• Date de parution: 2006
• Langue: anglais
• ISBN à 10 chiffres: 0743273893
• ISBN à 13 chiffres: 9780743273893
• Reliure: Hardcover
• Illustrateur: Jeffrey L. Ward (Map)
• Édition: First Printing [Stated].
• État de l'article: Very good
• État de la jaquette: Very good
• Signé: Signé par l'auteur
• Catalogues du vendeur:
  • Diplomacy
  • Insurgency
  • Iraq

A propos de ce titre

Synopsis

When Paul 'Jerry' Bremer, a retired diplomat and counterterrorism expert, arrived in post-war Baghdad as 'pro-consul', he was shocked. His hurried briefings in Washington by the State and Defence Departments and the C.I.A. had not prepared him for the devastation, the chaos, and the violence. With security worsening, the Iraqi army having disappeared, no viable local currency, looters running wild, the electricity system down, food supply in jeopardy and factions of Kurds, majority Shia, and the newly dispossessed Sunnis at a political standoff demanding Iraq be turned over to them. Ambassador Bremer struggled to jumpstart the economy while putting the country on the road to democracy. Bremer describes his meetings with President Bush and multiple encounters with Rumsfeld, Rice and Powell in which he pushed for additional funds for Iraq's reconstruction and warned of the dangers of prematurely turning security over to untrained Iraqi security forces and turning governance over to exiles with no plan for a constitution or elections. He describes working with Iraqi leaders on a constitution to protect individual rights and dramatizes the heroic efforts of his staff and Coalition forces to give the long-suffering Iraqi people a measure of peace and hope. Ambassador Bremer's book is vital reading if we wish to understand the immense stakes involved in this war and this troubled region.

Revue de presse

'When dealing with a primary source on given events, it is customary to say that anyone interested in them must read it. In this case, read it and weep'
Financial Times 4/2

'At the end of his tour of duty, still struggling to offload sovereignty to these men [Iraqi leaders], Mr Bremer admits: 'We've become the worst of all things - an ineffective occupier'
The Economist 28/1

'The book points up the huge gap between the reality on the ground in Iraq and the wishful thinking and bad intelligence that informed administration hawks thinking'
International Herald Tribune 18/1

'One of the important questions this book leaves us contemplating is whether the venture was always doomed to failure or was sabotaged by ineptitude and carelessness'
Scotland on Sunday 12/2

'Bremer's memoir, an amalgam of spin and sincerity... paints a troubling portrait of the administration's handling of the occupation. It underscores the degree to which certain fixed ideas held by the Bush White House hobbled post-war planning, such as the notion that America could "quickly turn full authority over to a group of selected Iraqi exiles", and flags up the chasm between what was actually happening in Iraq and the wishful thinking and bad intelligence that informed the thinking of administration hawks. Oil would pay for the country's reconstruction, the US blithely assumed: in fact, sabotage of pipelines and a decrepit industry infrastructure meant it did nothing of the sort. Administrative back-up was bogged down in red tape; the generals focused on the "most wanted" list of Saddam's supporters instead of tackling the resistance effectively; above all, too few troops made lawlessness the norm from the outset'
The Scotsman 11/2