Explanation, causation and deduction ( = The University of western Ontario series in Philosophy of science, volume 26 ).

Wilson, Fred:

ISBN 10: 9027718563 / ISBN 13: 9789027718563

Edité par Dordrecht, Boston and Lancaster, D. Reidel publishing company, 1985., 1985

A propos de cet article

8°, 22,5 x 15,5 cm. Original hardback in the original white dust jacket, this is slightly rubbed. XVIII, 385 pages. Apparently unused book in good condition. --- Originaler Pappband im originalen weißen Schutzumschlag, dieser ist leicht berieben. XVIII, 385 Seiten. Offenbar unbenutztes Buch in gutem Zustand. -- Bitte Portokosten außerhalb EU erfragen! / Please ask for postage costs outside EU! / S ' il vous plait demander des frais de port en dehors de l ' UE! // Bitte beachten Sie auch unsere Fotos! / Please also note our photos! / Veuillez noter nos photos -- Wir kaufen Ihre werthaltigen Bücher! Philo.

N° de réf. du vendeur 425514

Détails bibliographiques

• Titre: Explanation, causation and deduction ( = The University of western Ontario series in Philosophy of science, volume 26 ).
• Éditeur: Dordrecht, Boston and Lancaster, D. Reidel publishing company, 1985.
• Date de parution: 1985
• Langue: anglais
• ISBN à 10 chiffres: 9027718563
• ISBN à 13 chiffres: 9789027718563
• Reliure: Hardcover
• Édition: Edition originale
• État de la jaquette: Jaquette
• Catalogues du vendeur:
  • Philosophie

A propos de ce titre

Synopsis

The purpose of this essay is to defend the deductive-nomological model of explanation against a number of criticisms that have been made of it. It has traditionally been thought that scientific explanations were causal and that scientific explanations involved deduction from laws. In recent years, however, this three-fold identity has been challenged: there are, it is argued, causal explanations that are not scientific, scientific explanations that are not deductive, deductions from laws that are neither causal explanations nor scientific explanations, and causal explanations that involve no deductions from laws. The aim of the present essay is to defend the traditional identities, and to show that the more recent attempts at invalidating them fail in their object. More specifically, this essay argues that a Humean version of the deductive-nomological model of explanation can be defended as (1) the correct account of scientific explanation of individual facts and processes, and as (2) the correct account of causal explanations of individual facts and processes. The deductive-nomological model holds that to explain an event E, say that a is G, one must find some initial conditions C, say that a is F, and a law or theory T such that T and C jointly entail E, and both are essential to the deduction.