Game Theory: An Introduction

Tadelis, Steven

ISBN 10: 0691129088 / ISBN 13: 9780691129082

Edité par Princeton University Press, 2013

A propos de cet article

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Détails bibliographiques

• Titre: Game Theory: An Introduction
• Éditeur: Princeton University Press
• Date de parution: 2013
• Langue: anglais
• ISBN à 10 chiffres: 0691129088
• ISBN à 13 chiffres: 9780691129082
• Reliure: hardcover
• Édition: First Edition.
• État de l'article: New

A propos de ce titre

Synopsis

The definitive introduction to game theory

This comprehensive textbook introduces readers to the principal ideas and applications of game theory, in a style that combines rigor with accessibility. Steven Tadelis begins with a concise description of rational decision making, and goes on to discuss strategic and extensive form games with complete information, Bayesian games, and extensive form games with imperfect information. He covers a host of topics, including multistage and repeated games, bargaining theory, auctions, rent-seeking games, mechanism design, signaling games, reputation building, and information transmission games. Unlike other books on game theory, this one begins with the idea of rationality and explores its implications for multiperson decision problems through concepts like dominated strategies and rationalizability. Only then does it present the subject of Nash equilibrium and its derivatives.

Game Theory is the ideal textbook for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students. Throughout, concepts and methods are explained using real-world examples backed by precise analytic material. The book features many important applications to economics and political science, as well as numerous exercises that focus on how to formalize informal situations and then analyze them.

• Introduces the core ideas and applications of game theory
• Covers static and dynamic games, with complete and incomplete information
• Features a variety of examples, applications, and exercises
• Topics include repeated games, bargaining, auctions, signaling, reputation, and information transmission
• Ideal for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students
• Complete solutions available to teachers and selected solutions available to students

À propos de l?auteur

Steven Tadelis is associate professor and Barbara and Gerson Bakar Faculty Fellow at the Haas School of Business at the University of California, Berkeley, and a Distinguished Economist at eBay Research Labs.