Game Theory: Mathematical Models of Conflict (Mathematics and its Applications)

A. J. Jones

ISBN 10: 0853121478 / ISBN 13: 9780853121473

Edité par Ellis Horwood Ltd , Publisher, 1980

A propos de cet article

HARDBACK BOOK IN NEAR FINE CONDITION,FIRST BLANK PAGE IS CORNER-CLIPPED.

N° de réf. du vendeur 129368

Détails bibliographiques

• Titre: Game Theory: Mathematical Models of Conflict (Mathematics and its Applications)
• Éditeur: Ellis Horwood Ltd , Publisher
• Date de parution: 1980
• Langue: anglais
• ISBN à 10 chiffres: 0853121478
• ISBN à 13 chiffres: 9780853121473
• Reliure: Hardcover
• Édition: 1st Edition
• État de l'article: Near Fine
• Catalogues du vendeur:
  • Science
  • mathematics
  • Physics

A propos de ce titre

Synopsis

Game Theory: Mathematical Models of Conflict (Mathematics and its Applications)

Présentation de l'éditeur

Written engagingly and with agreeable humour, this book balances a light touch with a rigorous yet economical account of the theory of games and bargaining models. It provides a precise interpretation, discussion and mathematical analysis for a wide range of “game-like” problems in economics, sociology, strategic studies and war.

There is first an informal introduction to game theory, which can be understood by non-mathematicians, which covers the basic ideas of extensive form, pure and mixed strategies and the minimax theorem. The general theory of non-cooperative games is then given a detailed mathematical treatment in the second chapter. Next follows a “first class” account of linear programming, theory and practice, terse, rigorous and readable, which is applied as a tool to matrix games and economics from duality theory via the equilibrium theorem, with detailed explanations of computational aspects of the simplex algorithm.

The remaining chapters give an unusually comprehensive but concise treatment of cooperative games, an original account of bargaining models, with a skillfully guided tour through the Shapley and Nash solutions for bimatrix games and a carefully illustrated account of finding the best threat strategies.

• Balances a light touch with a rigorous yet economical account of the theory of games and bargaining models
• Shows basic ideas of extensive form, pure and mixed strategies, the minimax theorem, non-cooperative and co-operative games, and a ‘‘first class’’ account of linear programming, theory and practice
• Based on a series of lectures given by the author in the theory of games at Royal Holloway College