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shiny black hardcover 8vo. (octavo). dustwrapper in protective plastic book jacket cover. fine cond. binding square & tight. covers clean. edges clean with tiny scratch on bottom. contents free of markings. dustwrapper in fine cond. not worn or torn or price clipped. nice clean copy. no library markings, store stamps, stickers, bookplates, no names, inking, underlining, remainder markings etc~. first edition. first printing (#1 in # line). x+340p. glossy b&w photo illustrations. notes. select bibliography. index. world history. american history. latin american history. history of israel. covert operations. conspiracy theory. secret societies. CIA. mossad. espionage.~ The Iran~Contra hearings and the Tower Commission's report only began to unravel the tangled, almost unbelievable story of the American government's secret dealings with Iran, contrary to official policy and perhaps law. Adding a critical new chapter to this still unfolding drama, former Israeli military intelligence officer Samuel Segev offers the most complete understanding of the significant role played by Israeli government officials and arms merchants in these arms deals and negotiations for the release of the American hostages in Lebanon. The Iranian Triangle explores the history of the clandestine relationship between Israel and Iran, beginning in the 1950s, which involved the Shah and almost every major Israeli political leader from David Ben~Gurion and Golda Meir to Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, and Menachem Begin. Linking a wide range of activities, most importantly defense and oil supply, the Israeli~Iranian relationship aimed to weaken then~Egyptian President Nasser's grip on the region and limit Soviet influence ~ with the encouragement of the White House. Segev reveals how, in 1982, the U.S. supported Israel's plans to supply arms and military instructors for an (ultimately unrealized) coup attempt against Khomeini. Though the Khomeini Revolution led to the severance of formal ties with Israel, it did not close all channels to Tehran ~ nor halt Iran's interest in acquiring American arms. Israel once again became the liaison, paralleling the role it played in the days of the Shah. New facts about arms shipments and never~before~reported meetings between Israeli leaders, Khomeini agents and other factions engaged in Iran's internal power struggles, and U.S. government representatives expose the truth about the Iran arms sale operation. With a sharp eye for detail, Segev combs through a wealth of information ~ meetings transcripts, official records, unpublished primary sources, and interviews with key participants ~ to recount the events step by step. Here are the first negotiations between the Israelis and the Iranians, and the eventual participation of Reagan administration officials; the code~named plans for arms shipments to Iran ~ operations Cosmos, Espresso, Cappuccino, and Recovery~ some of which came to fruition, and others which went embarrassingly awry; the devastating failure to free all the hostages; and the inevitable denoument under the spotlight of public exposure. Revealing the web of contradictions and cross~purposes that beset policy in the U.S. and Israel, Segev offers a complete scorecard of the shifting players; documents the lies, mistrust, and discord among them; and recreates the tactical blunders committed in particular by Oliver North and Israel's Adviser on Terrorism Affairs, Amiram Nir, whose inexperience in the complexities of international relations and in the ways of the Iranians paved the way for the humiliation and resounding failure of McFarlane's "chocolate cake diplomacy" mission in May 1986. A provocative look at the misguided alliance that undermined the Reagan presidency, calling into question the very tenets of our foreign policy and shredding the credibility of our hard~line stance against international terrorism, this newsworthy book sheds invaluable new light on a critical chapter in U.S. international relations.
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