Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War

Richard D. Hooker, Jr. and Joseph F. Collins [Editors]

ISBN 10: 0160937035 / ISBN 13: 9780160937033

Edité par National Defense University Press, 2015

A propos de cet article

Trade paperback. Light wear to corners. Small scuff on rear cover spine edge. Two color maps. Color graphs and charts throughout. (xiv)473pp.

N° de réf. du vendeur ABE-1761663152149

Détails bibliographiques

• Titre: Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War
• Éditeur: National Defense University Press
• Date de parution: 2015
• Langue: anglais
• ISBN à 10 chiffres: 0160937035
• ISBN à 13 chiffres: 9780160937033
• Reliure: Soft cover
• Édition: 1st Edition
• État de l'article: Near Fine

A propos de ce titre

Synopsis

Historical Lessons from Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operations Iraqi Freedom and New Dawn in Iraq may appeal to senior officers and military science students

This publication assesses the Long War, now in its 14th year. Forged in the fires of the 9/11 attacks, the war includes campaigns against al Qaeda, major conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and operations in the Horn of Africa, the Republic of the Philippines, and globally, in the air and on the sea.

This assessment proceeds from two guiding sets of questions about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The core set of questions was suggested by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs: What did we gain? What did we lose? What costs did the United States pay for its response to 9/11, particularly from operations in Afghanistan and Iraq? How should the answers to these questions inform senior military leaders' contributions to future national security and national military strategy?

The second set of questions proceeds from the first: what are the strategic "lessons learned" (or "lessons encountered," as the British and the authors of this work prefer) of our experience in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, and Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and New Dawn in Iraq.

The book is divided in this manner: chapter one focuses on the early, pre-Surge years in both campaigns.
Chapter two continues the chronological thread but focuses on assessment and adaptation in the Surges in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Chapter three examines decision making at the national level and implementation.
Chapter four discusses security force assistance, the coalition's development of indigenous armies, and police forces.
Chapter five analyzes the complex set of legal issues attendant to irregular conflict, including detention and interrogation policy.
Chapter six develops the capstone conclusions of the study and isolates the most important lessons.

Supporting these chapters are three annexes: one on the human and financial costs of war, and, for reference, two others on the key events in both campaigns.

To orient the reader, the lessons encountered in these chapters are divided into a few functional areas: national-level decision making, unity of effort/unity of command,
intelligence and understanding the operational environment, character of contemporary conflict, and security force assistance.

This historical edited volume is intended for future senior officers, their advisors, and other national security decision makers. However, the content could also prove useful to students in joint professional military courses and military science classes that may qualify them for work in the field of strategy.







The authors herein treat only the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, the largest U.S. efforts.The primary objective is intended to provide information and guidance to future senior officers, their advisors, and other national security decision makers. By derivation, it also can be a book for students in joint professional military education courses, which will qualify them to work in the field of strategy and military oriented civilians. While the book tends to focus on strategic decisions and developments of land wars among the people, it acknowledges that the status of the United States as a great power and the strength of its ground forces depend in large measure on the dominance of the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force in their respective domains.

Audience: military senior officers, military advisors, national security decision makers, professors of military history and warfare

À propos de l?auteur

Dr. Richard D. Hooker, Jr., is the Director for Research and Strategic Support and Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University (NDU) in Washington, DC. As a member of the Senior Executive Service, Dr. Hooker served as Deputy Commandant and Dean of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Defense College in Rome from September 2010-August 2013. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, International Institute of Strategic Studies, and Foreign Policy Research Institute, and is a Fellow of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. Dr. Hooker taught at the United States Military Academy at West Point and held the Chief of Staff of the Army Chair at the National War College. He served with the Office of National Service at the White House under President George H.W. Bush, with the Arms Control and Defense Directorate at the National Security Council (NSC) during the administration of William J. Clinton, and with the NSC Office for Iraq and Afghanistan during the administration of George W. Bush. While at the NSC he was a contributing author to The National Security Strategy of the United States . His areas of expertise include Defense Policy and Strategy, the Middle East, NATO/Europe, and Civil-Military Relations. Dr. Hooker graduated with a BS from the United States Military Academy in 1981 and holds an MA and Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Virginia. He is a Distinguished Graduate of the National War College, where he earned a Master of Science in National Security Studies and also served as a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow. His publications have been used widely in staff and defense college curricula in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, and include more than 50 articles and 3 books on security and defense-related topics. Dr.Hooker has lectured extensively at leading academic and military institutions in the United States and abroad. Prior to his retirement from Active duty, Dr.Hooker served for 30 years in the U.S. Army as a parachute infantry officer in the United States and Europe. While on Active duty he participated in military operations in Grenada, Somalia, Rwanda, the Sinai, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan, including command of a parachute brigade in Baghdad from January 2005 to January 2006. His military service also included tours in the offices of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Secretary of the Army, and Chief of Staff of the Army.

Dr. Joseph J. Collins is the Director of the Center for Complex Operations in INSS. He joined the National War College faculty in 2004 as Professor of National Security Strategy, where he taught military strategy, U.S. domestic context, and irregular warfare. He also directed the college's writing program. Prior to his decade at the National War College, Dr. Collins served for 3 years as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations, the Pentagon's senior civilian official for peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and stabilization and reconstruction operations. His team led the stability opera-
tions effort in Afghanistan. From 1998-2001, he was a Senior Fellow in the Center for Strategic and International Studies, where he did research on economic sanctions, military culture, and national security policy. In 1998, Dr. Collins retired from the U.S. Army as a colonel after nearly 28 years of military service. His Army years were equally divided between infantry and armor assignments in the United States, South Korea, and Germany; teaching at West Point in the Department of Social Sciences; and a series of assignments in the Pentagon, including Army Staff Officer for NATO and Warsaw Pact strategic
issues, Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff of the Army, Military Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy during Operation Desert Storm, and Special Assistant and Chief Speechwriter to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Dr. Collins has also taught as adjunct faculty in the graduate divisions of Columbia University and Georgetown University. He is a life member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Dr. Collins holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University and a BA from Fordham University. He is also an honor graduate of the Army's Command and General Staff College and holds
a diploma from the National War College. Dr. Collins's many publications include books and articles on the Soviet war in Afghanistan, Operation Desert Storm, contemporary U.S. military culture, defense transformation, and homeland defense. His most recent publications include Choosing War: The Decision to Invade Iraq and Its Aftermath (NDU Press, 2008) and Understanding War in Afghanistan (NDU Press, 2011).