Strategic Command and Control; Redefining the Nuclear Threat

Blair, Bruce G.

10 évaluations par Goodreads

Langue : anglais

Edité par The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 1985

0815709811 / 9780815709817

  • Éd. originale
  • Livre broché
  • Occasion
Afficher toutes les informations
Partenaire historique

Vendeur : Ground Zero Books, Ltd., Silver Spring, MD, Etats-UnisGround Zero Books, Ltd.

Vendeur avec une évaluation de 5 étoiles

Vendeur AbeBooks depuis 14 août 1998

Livre broché

Etat: Occasion - Assez bon

EUR 29,86

EUR 4,46 expédition 
Expédition nationale : Etats-Unis

Quantité disponible : 3 disponibles

Ajouter au panier
Retours gratuits sous 30 jours

A propos de cet article

xiv, 341, [13] pages. Illustrations, black & white. Abbreviations and Acronyms. Map. Footnotes. Index. Cover has slight wear and soiling. Bruce G. Blair (born 1947) is a nuclear security expert and a research scholar at the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He focuses on technical and policy steps on the path toward the verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons, specifically on deep bilateral nuclear arms reductions, multilateral arms negotiations and de-alerting of nuclear arsenals. In 2011, he was appointed to the U.S. Secretary of State’s International Security Advisory Board, a group of experts that provides the Department of State with independent insight and advice on all aspects of international security, disarmament and arms control. In 1999, he was awarded a MacArthur Fellowship Prize for his research and leadership on de-alerting nuclear forces. After summarizing the assumptions and evaluative methodology behind mainstream strategic theory, the study describes the current decentralized command and control system that, under conditions of surprise attack, could be unable to communicate with decision makers or with units responsible for executing the decisions. During the past twenty-five years, U.S. strategists have argued that avoiding nuclear war depends on deterring a Soviet first strike by ensuring that U.S. forces could survive a surprise attack in numbers sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation. U.S. military and political leaders have thus emphasized acquiring more powerful and accurate weaponry and providing better protection for it, while defense analysts have focused on assessing the relative strength and survivability of U.S. and Soviet forces. In the process neither has given sufficient attention to the vulnerability of the U.S. command, control, and communications system that would coordinate warning of an attack in progress and the response to it. In this study Bruce G. Blair examines accepted assumptions about mutual deterrence, force strength, and survivability, and concludes that the vulnerability of command, control, and communications not only precludes an effective retaliatory strike but also invites a preemptive Soviet first strike. After summarizing the assumptions and evaluative methodology behind mainstream strategic theory, the study describes the current decentralized command and control system that, under conditions of surprise attack, could be unable to communicate with decision makers or with units responsible for executing the decisions. Blair traces in detail the development of the system over three decades; the attempts to improve it through the use of procedural guidelines, alternative and redundant communications channels, and survival tactics; and the continuing vulnerabilities from improved Soviet weapons and the environmental forces engendered by massive nuclear detonations. Blair also analyzes the probable effects of proposals by the Reagan administration to strengthen command, control, and communications systems and provides recommendations for further strengthening and for altering related policies, deployments, and strategies to improve the stability of deterrence. First edition. First paperback edition. First printing [stated].…

N° de réf. du vendeur 71926

Titre
Strategic Command and Control; Redefining the Nuclear Threat
Auteur
Blair, Bruce G.
Éditeur
The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC
Année de publication
1985
État de l'article
Very good
Reliure
Trade paperback
Langue
anglais
ISBN à 10 chiffres
0815709811
ISBN à 13 chiffres
9780815709817
Édition
Edition originale
Catalogues du vendeur
Deterrence, Nuclear Weapons

Ground Zero Books, Ltd.

Silver Spring, MD, Etats-Unis

Vendeur avec une évaluation de 5 étoiles

Vendeur AbeBooks depuis 14 août 1998

Frais d'expédition à l'intérieur de ce pays : Etats-Unis

Article5 à 20 jours ouvrés3 à 6 jours ouvrés
Premier articleEUR 4,46EUR 6,69
Les délais de livraison sont fixés par les vendeurs et varient en fonction du transporteur et du lieu. Les commandes transitant par les douanes peuvent être retardées et les acheteurs sont responsables de tous les droits ou frais associés. Les vendeurs peuvent vous contacter au sujet de frais supplémentaires afin de couvrir toute augmentation des coûts d'expédition de vos articles.

Modes de paiement

  • Visa
  • Mastercard
  • American Express
  • Carte Bleue
  • Apple Pay
  • Google Pay
  • Chèque
  • Facture
  • Mandat
  • Paypal

Description de la boutique

Founded and operated by trained historians, Ground Zero Books, Ltd., serves the book collector, the scholar, and institutions. We focus on the individual, and pride ourselves on our personal service. Please contact us with your wants, as we have many books not yet listed in our database.

Spécialité

Military History, Nuclear, American Revolution, Military Medicine, Vietnam, World War II, British Empire, World War I, Unit Histories, Civil War

Profil professionnel du vendeur

Ground Zero Books, Ltd.

9033 Georgia Avenue
Silver Spring, MD Etats-Unis 20910-2254