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First edition, rare. "On 10 June 1933, Einstein gave his Herbert Spenser Lecture 'On the Methods of Theoretical Physics' at the University of Oxford. He lectured for the first time in English, reading from a prepared translation. The lecture was to describe the methods used to discover theories in physics. It began with a self-mocking warning, perhaps because he sensed the account he was about to give was shocking: 'If you want to find out anything from the theoretical physicists about the methods they use, I advise you to stick closely to one principle: do not listen to their words, fix your attention on their deeds.' As the lecture developed it was not immediately apparent why Einstein should have entered into such an experiment in irony. He proceeded to a safe, empiricist disclaimer on the limited role of pure logic in science: 'Pure logical thinking cannot yield us any knowledge of the empirical world; all knowledge of reality starts from experience and ends with it.' This was followed by a more adventurous claim: while the fundamental concepts and postulates of our theories must accommodate experience, they are otherwise 'free inventions of the human intellect'. This freedom, he continued, had not been recognised in earlier centuries when natural philosophers erroneously believed that these concepts and postulates could be deduced from experience. So how are we to find them? . . . : 'If, then, it is true that the axiomatic basis of theoretical physics cannot be extracted from experience but must be freely invented, can we ever hope to find the right way? Nay, more, has this right way any existence outside our illusions? Can we hope to be guided safely by experience at all when there exist theories (such as classical mechanics) which to a large extent do justice to experience, without getting to the root of the matter? I answer without hesitation that there is, in my opinion, a right way, and that we are capable of finding it. Our experience hitherto justifies us in believing that nature is the realisation of the simplest conceivable mathematical ideas. I am convinced that we can discover by means of purely mathematical constructions the concepts and the laws connecting them with each other, which furnish the key to the understanding of natural phenomena. Experience may suggest the appropriate mathematical concepts, but they most certainly cannot be deduced from it. Experience remains, of course, the sole criterion of the physical utility of a mathematical construction. But the creative principle resides in mathematics. In a certain sense, therefore, I hold it true that pure thought can grasp reality, as the ancients dreamed.' To remove any doubt that Einstein had a quite concrete understanding of this 'right method', he proceeded to show how it leads directly to the two most successful theories of his time outside the quantum domain, Maxwell's electrodynamics and his own general theory of relativity: 'In order to justify this confidence, I am compelled to make use of a mathematical concept. The physical world is represented as a four-dimensional continuum. If I assume a Riemannian metric in it and ask what are the simplest laws which such a metric can satisfy, I arrive at the relativistic theory of gravitation in empty space. If in that space I assume a vector-field or an anti-symmetrical tensor field which can be derived from it, and ask what are the simplest laws which such a field can satisfy, I arrive at Maxwell's equations for empty space'" (Norton, ''Nature is the Realisation of the Simplest Conceivable Mathematical Ideas': Einstein and the Canon of Mathematical Simplicity', Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, Part B, 31 (2000), pp. 135-170). RBH lists 2 copies, the last realised $1408 at Bonhams NY in 2003. Weil 188. 12mo (168 x 106 mm), pp. 16. Publisher's printed wrappers (light vertical crease to front wrapper, bookseller's ticket inside front wrapper). Near fine. N° de réf. du vendeur ABE-1721989624705
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