Repeated Games with Incomplete Information. With the Collaboration of Richard E. Stearns.

AUMANN (Robert J.) & MASCHLER (Michael B.)

Date d'édition : 1995

A propos de cet article

First edition, first printing. 8vo. xvii, [1], 342 pp. Original red cloth, spine lettered in silver, dust jacket. A very fine copy. Cambridge, Massachusetts; The MIT Press. 'Robert Aumann has played an essential and indispensable role in shaping game theory and much of economic theory' (New Palgrave). Aumann was jointly awarded the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics along with Thomas C. Schelling 'for having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis.' The present collection brings together five seminal papers written by Aumann in collaboration with Michael Maschler and Richard Stearns during the height of the Cold War, between 1965 and 1968, on the dynamics of arms control negotiations. These papers have since become foundational to work on repeated games and are gathered here for the first time along with the addition of substantial "postscripts" by the authors describing many of the developments since their original publication.

N° de réf. du vendeur 244053

Détails bibliographiques

• Titre: Repeated Games with Incomplete Information. With the Collaboration of Richard E. Stearns.
• Date de parution: 1995
• Reliure: Couverture rigide
• Édition: Edition originale
• État de la jaquette: Jaquette