[ Signed Copy ] Logical Pluralism.

Beall, Jc and Greg Restall:

ISBN 10: 0199288410 / ISBN 13: 9780199288410

Edité par Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006

A propos de cet article

VIII, 143 p. A good copy. - With Signature of JC Beall. - Contents I Preliminaries 1 Introduction 2 Logical Consequence 2.1 Propositions 2.2 Arguments 2.3 Necessity 2.4 Normativity 2.5 Formality 2.6 Cases 3 Pluralism Defined 3.1 What Kind of Claim is Logical Pluralism? . 3.2 Logical Pluralism in a Nutshell 3.3 The Case for Logical Pluralism 3.4 What Lies Ahead? Il Logics 4 Classical Logic 4.1 Specification of Cases 4.2 Admissibility 4.3 Emergence of Plurality 4.4 Applications 4.5 Summary 5 Relevant Logic 5.1 Specification of Cases 5.2 Relevant Consequence 5.3 Admissibility 5.4 Pluralism 5.5 Applications 5.6 Summary 6 Constructive Logic 6.1 Cases as Stages 6.2 Admissibility 6.3 Applications 7 Variations if Loose Ends 7.1 Free Logics 7.2 Second- and Higher-Order Logics 7.3 Languages and Logics 7.4 Loose Ends Ill Objections, Replies, Other Directions 8 General Objections 9 Specific Objections 10 Other Directions 10.1 Recognising Plurality 10.2 Exploiting Plurality 10.3 Plurality and Proofs Index. ISBN 9780199288410 Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 188. N° de réf. du vendeur 1232472

Détails bibliographiques

Titre : [ Signed Copy ] Logical Pluralism.

Éditeur : Oxford: Clarendon Press

Date d'édition : 2006

Reliure : Paperback.

Etat : Sehr gut

Signé : Signé par l'auteur

A propos de ce titre

Présentation de l'éditeur:

Consequence is at the heart of logic; an account of consequence, of what follows from what, offers a vital tool in the evaluation of arguments. Since philosophy itself proceeds by way of argument and inference, a clear view of what logical consequence amounts to is of central importance to the whole discipline. In this book JC Beall and Greg Restall present and defend what thay call logical pluralism, arguing that the notion of logical consequence doesn't pin down one deductive consequence relation; it allows for many of them. In particular, they argue that broadly classical, intuitionistic, and relevant accounts of deductive logic are genuine logical consequence relations; we should not search for one true logic, since there are many. Their conclusions have profound implications for many linguists as well as for philosophers.