Excerpt from Assessing Comition in the Market for Corporate Acquisitions: November 1981
Since the managerial objective function is unknown, I develop the conditions for rivalry under stockholder wealth maximization in section and managerial welfare maximization in section When an objective of shareholder wealth maximization is assumed, rivalry is characterized in terms of the gain that accrues to potential bidding firms; the price of the target firm rises until the acquisition is a nonnegative net present value investment for only the successful bidder. Under managerial welfare maximization, the offer price rises until only the successful bidder's management realizes an increase in welfare from the acquisition.
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Paperback. Etat : New. Print on Demand. This book examines the concept of rivalry within the market for corporate acquisitions. The author posits two different managerial objective functions to define the conditions for rivalry: stockholder wealth maximization and managerial welfare maximization. The author argues that stockholder wealth maximization implies that the price paid for a target firm is bid up until the acquisition is a non-negative net present value investment for only the successful bidder. Rivalry under managerial welfare maximization, on the other hand, does not assume that bidders maximize equity values and admits the possibility of negative net present value acquisitions. Using data for 22 unsuccessful tender offers, the author finds that the data is inconsistent with rivalry under stockholder wealth maximization. However, the data does seem consistent with the restricted form of rivalry under managerial welfare maximization. This suggests that the observed rivalry in the market for corporate control may not be sufficient to ensure that resources are allocated to their most productive use. This book is a reproduction of an important historical work, digitally reconstructed using state-of-the-art technology to preserve the original format. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in the book. print-on-demand item. N° de réf. du vendeur 9781332890613_0
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Vendeur : PBShop.store US, Wood Dale, IL, Etats-Unis
PAP. Etat : New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000. N° de réf. du vendeur LW-9781332890613
Quantité disponible : 15 disponible(s)
Vendeur : PBShop.store UK, Fairford, GLOS, Royaume-Uni
PAP. Etat : New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000. N° de réf. du vendeur LW-9781332890613
Quantité disponible : 15 disponible(s)