Isbn: 9781332890613 - assessing competition in the market for corporate acquisitions: november 1981 (classic reprint) (3 résultats)

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  • Langue : anglais

    Edité par Forgotten Books, 2018

    133289061X / 9781332890613

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    Vendeur : PBShop.store US, Wood Dale, IL, Etats-UnisPBShop.store US

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    Etat: Neuf

    EUR 25,06

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    Expédition nationale : Etats-Unis

    Quantité disponible : 15 disponible(s)

    PAP. Etat : New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

  • Langue : anglais

    Edité par Forgotten Books, 2018

    133289061X / 9781332890613

    • Couverture souple

    Vendeur : PBShop.store UK, Fairford, GLOS, Royaume-UniPBShop.store UK

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    Etat: Neuf

    EUR 24,38

    EUR 3,83 expédition 
    Expédition depuis Royaume-Uni vers Etats-Unis

    Quantité disponible : 15 disponible(s)

    PAP. Etat : New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

  • Langue : anglais

    Edité par Forgotten Books, 2018

    133289061X / 9781332890613

    • Couverture souple
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    Vendeur : Forgotten Books, London, Royaume-UniForgotten Books

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    Etat: Neuf

    EUR 15,73

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    Expédition depuis Royaume-Uni vers Etats-Unis

    Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles

    Paperback. Etat : New. Print on Demand. This book examines the concept of rivalry within the market for corporate acquisitions. The author posits two different managerial objective functions to define the conditions for rivalry: stockholder wealth maximization and managerial welfare maximization. The author argues that stockholder wealth maximization implies that the price paid for a target firm is bid up until the acquisition is a non-negative net present value investment for only the successful bidder. Rivalry under managerial welfare maximization, on the other hand, does not assume that bidders maximize equity values and admits the possibility of negative net present value acquisitions. Using data for 22 unsuccessful tender offers, the author finds that the data is inconsistent with rivalry under stockholder wealth maximization. However, the data does seem consistent with the restricted form of rivalry under managerial welfare maximization. This suggests that the observed rivalry in the market for corporate control may not be sufficient to ensure that resources are allocated to their most productive use. This book is a reproduction of an important historical work, digitally reconstructed using state-of-the-art technology to preserve the original format. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in the book. print-on-demand item. …