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Paperback. Etat : new. Paperback. What sort of thing is the mind? And how can such a thing at the same time- belong to the natural world,- represent the world,- give rise to our subjective experience,- and ground human knowledge?Content, Consciousness and Perception is an edited collection, comprising eleven new contributions to the philosophy of mind, written by some of the most promising young philosophers in the UK and Ireland. The book is arranged into three parts. Part I, Concepts and Mental Content, which begins with an attack by Hans-Johann Glock on the representational theory of mind, addresses the nature of mental representation. Part II, Consciousness and the Metaphysics of Mind, concerns the prospects for a naturalistic metaphysics of the conscious mind. Finally, Part III, entitled Perception, pursues the project of giving a satisfactory philosophical account of perceptual experience.The book begins with an introductory essay by the editors, which provides an overview of the state of contemporary philosophy of mind, locating the articles to follow within that context.The individual chapters of Content, Consciousness and Perception are professional contributions to their respective areas, of interest to any philosopher of mind. The volume as a whole is ideal for non-specialists and students interested in getting to grips with the state of the art in contemporary philosophy of mind. What sort of thing is the mind? And how can such a thing at the same time- belong to the natural world,- represent the world,- give rise to our subjective experience,- and ground human knowledge? Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. …

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Paperback. Etat : Brand New. new edition. 222 pages. 8.10x5.80x0.60 inches. In Stock.

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Etat : New. 2008. 1st Edition. paperback. . . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Etat : New. 2008. 1st Edition. paperback. . . . . .

HRD. Etat : New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

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HRD. Etat : New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

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Paperback. Etat : new. Paperback. What sort of thing is the mind? And how can such a thing at the same time- belong to the natural world,- represent the world,- give rise to our subjective experience,- and ground human knowledge?Content, Consciousness and Perception is an edited collection, comprising eleven new contributions to the philosophy of mind, written by some of the most promising young philosophers in the UK and Ireland. The book is arranged into three parts. Part I, Concepts and Mental Content, which begins with an attack by Hans-Johann Glock on the representational theory of mind, addresses the nature of mental representation. Part II, Consciousness and the Metaphysics of Mind, concerns the prospects for a naturalistic metaphysics of the conscious mind. Finally, Part III, entitled Perception, pursues the project of giving a satisfactory philosophical account of perceptual experience.The book begins with an introductory essay by the editors, which provides an overview of the state of contemporary philosophy of mind, locating the articles to follow within that context.The individual chapters of Content, Consciousness and Perception are professional contributions to their respective areas, of interest to any philosopher of mind. The volume as a whole is ideal for non-specialists and students interested in getting to grips with the state of the art in contemporary philosophy of mind. What sort of thing is the mind? And how can such a thing at the same time- belong to the natural world,- represent the world,- give rise to our subjective experience,- and ground human knowledge? Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability. …

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Etat : New. In English.

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Hardback. Etat : New. Epistemology, like ethics, is normative. Just as ethics addresses questions about how we ought to act, so epistemology addresses questions about how we ought to believe and enquire. We can also ask metanormative questions. What does it mean to claim that someone ought to do or believe something? Do such claims express beliefs about independently existing facts, or only attitudes of approval and disapproval towards certain pieces of conduct? How do putative facts about what people ought to do or believe fit in to the natural world? In the case of ethics, such questions have been subject to extensive and systematic investigation, yielding the thriving subdiscipline of metaethics. Yet the corresponding questions have been largely ignored in epistemology; there is no serious subdiscipline of metaepistemology. This surprising state of affairs reflects a more general tendency for ethics and epistemology to be carried out largely in isolation from each other, despite the important substantive and structural connections between them. A movement to overturn the general tendency has only recently gained serious momentum, and has yet to tackle metanormative questions in a sustained way. This edited collection aims to stimulate this project and thus advance the new subdiscipline of metaepistemology. Its original essays draw on the sophisticated theories and frameworks that have been developed in metaethics concerning practical normativity, examine whether they can be applied to epistemic normativity, and consider what this might tell us about both.…