Fissile (21 résultats)

Wraps. Etat : Good. [8], 43, [1] pages. Illustrations (photographs, figures, and tables--some with color). Acronyms. Endnotes. Cover has slight wear and soiling. Numerous ink marks/comments noted. The International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) was founded in January 2006. It is an independent group of arms-control and nonproliferation experts from both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states. The mission of the IPFM is to analyze the technical basis for practical and achievable policy initiatives to secure, consolidate, and reduce stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and plutonium. These fissile materials are the key ingredients in nuclear weapons, and their control is critical to nuclear weapons disarmament, to halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and to ensuring that terrorists do not acquire nuclear weapons. IPFM research and reports are shared with international organizations, national governments and nongovernmental groups. The founding members of the Panel include experts from sixteen countries: Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. Princeton University's Program on Science and Global Security provides administrative and research support for IPFM. This report identified the current state at Sellafield, the underperforming commercial operations that contribute to its legacy, the clean-up and decommissioning plans for the site, proposals for the management of the stockpiles of separated plutonium and uranium and nuclear wastes, and lastly the overall socio-economic and health impact of the Sellafield enterprise on the local communities.…

2005, broché, 48pp - bon état.

Wraps. Etat : Very good. Presumed First Edition, First printing. [6], ii, 107, [1] pages. Figures. Tables. References. Cover has slight wear and soiling. Contributors included Matthew Bunn, Anatoli Diakov, Ming Ding, Tadahiro Katsute, Charles McCombie, M.V. Ramana, Tatsujiro Suzuki, Susan Voss and Suyyan Yu. In the 1970s, nuclear energy was expected to quickly become the dominant generator of electrical power. Its fuel costs are remarkably low because a million times more energy is released per unit weight by fission than by combustion. But its capital costs have proven to be high. Safety requires redundant cooling and control systems, massive leak-tight containment structures, very conservative seismic design and extremely stringent quality control. The routine health risks and greenhouse-gas emissions from fission power are small relative to those associated with coal, but there are catastrophic risks: nuclear-weapon proliferation and the possibility of over-heated fuel releasing massive quantities of fission products to the human environment. The 1979 Three Mile Island and 1986 Chernobyl accidents, along with high capital costs, ended the rapid growth of global nuclear-power capacity. Today, there are hopes for a "nuclear renaissance" but nuclear energy in Western Europe and North America, which together account for 63 percent of current global capacity, is being dogged again by high capital costs and it is not yet clear that new construction will offset the retirement of old capacity. The IAEA does not expect nuclear power to significantly increase its current share of about 15 percent of global electric-power generation. The International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) was founded in January 2006 and is an independent group of arms-control and nonproliferation experts from both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states. The mission of the IPFM is to analyze the technical basis for practical and achievable policy initiatives to secure, consolidate, and reduce stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and plutonium. These fissile materials are the key ingredients in nuclear weapons, and their control is critical to nuclear weapons disarmament, to halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and to ensuring that terrorists do not acquire nuclear weapons. Both military and civilian stocks of fissile materials have to be addressed. The nuclear-weapon states still have enough fissile materials in their weapon stockpiles for tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. On the civilian side, enough plutonium has been separated to make a similarly large number of weapons. Highly enriched uranium is used in civilian reactor fuel in more than one hundred locations. The total amount used for this purpose is sufficient to make about one thousand Hiroshima-type bombs, a design well within the potential capabilities of terrorist groups. The Panel is co-chaired by Professor Frank N. von Hippel of Princeton University and Professor R. Rajaraman of Jawaharlal Nehru University, India. Other members include: James M. Acton, Li Bin, José Goldemberg, Pervez Hoodbhoy, Patricia Lewis, Abdul Hameed Nayyar, M.V. Ramana, and Mycle Schneider. The Panel produces an annual Global Fissile Material Report which summarizes new information on fissile material stocks and production worldwide, as well as periodic research reports. Its members include nuclear experts from seventeen countries: Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Iran, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Pakistan, South Korea, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. This group of countries includes seven nuclear-weapon states and ten non-weapon states. IPFM research and reports are shared with international organizations, national governments and nongovernmental groups. It has full panel meetings twice a year at capitals around the world in addition to specialist workshops.…

Dos carré collé. In-12 (13,2 x 19,6 cm), dos carré collé, 121 pages ; petite trace au premier plat, par ailleurs bel état. Livraison a domicile (La Poste) ou en Mondial Relay sur simple demande. Pire.

Dos carré collé. In-12 (11,2 x 16 cm), dos carré collé, 63 pages ; très bon état. Livraison a domicile (La Poste) ou en Mondial Relay sur simple demande.

Couverture souple. Etat : Très bon.

Wraps. Etat : Very good. Presumed First Edition, First printing. [4], 83, [1] pages. Maps. Endnotes. Cover has slight wear and soiling. The Panel produces an annual Global Fissile Material Report which summarizes new information on fissile material stocks and production worldwide, as well as periodic research reports. Almost two decades since the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia still retain stockpiles of about 10,000 nuclear weapons each and have committed only to reduce to about half that number by the end of 2012, when the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty comes into force. There are now seven other nuclear weapon states, including North Korea, which carried out its first nuclear test on October 9, 2006. Their arsenals range from a few simple warheads to several hundred high-yield thermonuclear weapons. There are growing concerns about a loss of momentum in the nuclear disarmament process, additional states acquiring nuclear weapons, and the possibility of nuclear terrorism. Fissile materials, ordinarily plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU), are the essential ingredients in all nuclear weapons. Securing, consolidating, and eliminating fissile material stocks worldwide are the common imperatives in the overlapping efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons in the countries where they exist, halt their spread to still more countries, and prevent terrorists from obtaining them. This is the third report by International Panel on Fissile Materials on the global situation with regard to efforts to secure and eliminate fissile materials. A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) would ban the production of fissile material - in practice highly-enriched uranium and separated plutonium - for weapons. It has been supported by strong majorities in the United Nations. After it comes into force, newly produced fissile materials could only be produced under international - most likely International Atomic Energy Agency - monitoring. Many non-weapon states argue that the treaty should also place under safeguards pre-existing stocks of fissile material in civilian use or declared excess for weapons so as to make nuclear-weapons reductions irreversible. This paper discusses the scope of the FMCT, the ability to detect clandestine production and verification challenges in the nuclear-weapons states. The International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) was founded in January 2006 and is an independent group of arms-control and nonproliferation experts from both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states. The mission of the IPFM is to analyze the technical basis for practical and achievable policy initiatives to secure, consolidate, and reduce stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and plutonium. These fissile materials are the key ingredients in nuclear weapons, and their control is critical to nuclear weapons disarmament, to halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and to ensuring that terrorists do not acquire nuclear weapons. Both military and civilian stocks of fissile materials have to be addressed. The nuclear-weapon states still have enough fissile materials in their weapon stockpiles for tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. On the civilian side, enough plutonium has been separated to make a similarly large number of weapons. Highly enriched uranium is used in civilian reactor fuel in more than one hundred locations. The total amount used for this purpose is sufficient to make about one thousand Hiroshima-type bombs, a design well within the potential capabilities of terrorist groups. The Panel has been co-chaired since 2015 by Professor Alexander Glaser and Dr. Zia Mian of Princeton University and Professor Tatsujiro Suzuki of Nagasaki University, Japan. Previously, it was co-chaired by Professor Jose Goldemberg of the University of Sao Paolo, Brazil (2006-2007), Dr. R. Rajaraman (2007-2014) Professor Emeritus, of Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India, and Professor Frank von Hippel of Princeton University (2006-2014). Its members include nuclear experts from seven.…

Couverture souple. Etat : bon. R100090496: 2008. In-8. Broché. Bon état, Couv. convenable, Dos satisfaisant, Intérieur frais. Non paginé, environ 8 pages. . . . Classification Dewey : 840.092-XXI ème siècle.

Couverture souple. Etat : Bon. Traduction : Traduit du tchèque par Xavier Galmiche.

Couverture souple. Etat : Comme neuf. Philippe Guitton (illustrateur). Book.

Softcover. Etat : Très bon. Ancien livre de bibliothèque avec équipements. Edition 2008. Ammareal reverse jusqu'à 15% du prix net de cet article à des organisations caritatives. ENGLISH DESCRIPTION Book Condition: Used, Very good. Former library book. Edition 2008. Ammareal gives back up to 15% of this item's net price to charity organizations.…

Dos carré collé. In-12 (9,5 x 18 cm), dos carré collé, 66 pages ; très bon état. Livraison a domicile (La Poste) ou en Mondial Relay sur simple demande.

Dos carré collé. In-8 (14 x 21 cm), dos carré collé, 101 pages, 1 de 500 exemplaires sur Olin mat ; quelques petites traces au premier plat, par ailleurs bon état général. Livraison a domicile (La Poste) ou en Mondial Relay sur simple demande.

Wraps. Etat : Very good. Presumed First Edition, First printing. [4], 138, [2] pages. Maps. illustrations. Endnotes. Cover has slight wear and soiling. The Panel produces an annual Global Fissile Material Report which summarizes new information on fissile material stocks and production worldwide, as well as periodic research reports. Almost two decades since the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia still retain stockpiles of about 10,000 nuclear weapons each and have committed only to reduce to about half that number by the end of 2012, when the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty comes into force. There are now seven other nuclear weapon states, including North Korea, which carried out its first nuclear test on October 9, 2006. Their arsenals range from a few simple warheads to several hundred high-yield thermonuclear weapons. There are growing concerns about a loss of momentum in the nuclear disarmament process, additional states acquiring nuclear weapons, and the possibility of nuclear terrorism. Fissile materials, ordinarily plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU), are the essential ingredients in all nuclear weapons. Securing, consolidating, and eliminating fissile material stocks worldwide are the common imperatives in the overlapping efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons in the countries where they exist, halt their spread to still more countries, and prevent terrorists from obtaining them. This is the third report by International Panel on Fissile Materials on the global situation with regard to efforts to secure and eliminate fissile materials. A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) would ban the production of fissile material - in practice highly-enriched uranium and separated plutonium - for weapons. It has been supported by strong majorities in the United Nations. After it comes into force, newly produced fissile materials could only be produced under international - most likely International Atomic Energy Agency - monitoring. Many non-weapon states argue that the treaty should also place under safeguards pre-existing stocks of fissile material in civilian use or declared excess for weapons so as to make nuclear-weapons reductions irreversible. This paper discusses the scope of the FMCT, the ability to detect clandestine production and verification challenges in the nuclear-weapons states. The International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) was founded in January 2006 and is an independent group of arms-control and nonproliferation experts from both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states. The mission of the IPFM is to analyze the technical basis for practical and achievable policy initiatives to secure, consolidate, and reduce stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and plutonium. These fissile materials are the key ingredients in nuclear weapons, and their control is critical to nuclear weapons disarmament, to halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and to ensuring that terrorists do not acquire nuclear weapons. Both military and civilian stocks of fissile materials have to be addressed. The nuclear-weapon states still have enough fissile materials in their weapon stockpiles for tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. On the civilian side, enough plutonium has been separated to make a similarly large number of weapons. Highly enriched uranium is used in civilian reactor fuel in more than one hundred locations. The total amount used for this purpose is sufficient to make about one thousand Hiroshima-type bombs, a design well within the potential capabilities of terrorist groups. The Panel has been co-chaired since 2015 by Professor Alexander Glaser and Dr. Zia Mian of Princeton University and Professor Tatsujiro Suzuki of Nagasaki University, Japan. Previously, it was co-chaired by Professor Jose Goldemberg of the University of Sao Paolo, Brazil (2006-2007), Dr. R. Rajaraman (2007-2014) Professor Emeritus, of Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India, and Professor Frank von Hippel of Princeton University (2006-2014). Its members include nuclear ex.…

Wraps. Etat : Very good. Presumed First Edition, First printing. [6], 164, [2] pages. Maps. Illustrations (some with color). Appendix. Endnotes. Glossary. Cover has slight wear and soiling. The Panel produces an annual Global Fissile Material Report which summarizes new information on fissile material stocks and production worldwide, as well as periodic research reports. Almost two decades since the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia still retain stockpiles of about 10,000 nuclear weapons each and have committed only to reduce to about half that number by the end of 2012, when the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty comes into force. There are now seven other nuclear weapon states, including North Korea, which carried out its first nuclear test on October 9, 2006. Their arsenals range from a few simple warheads to several hundred high-yield thermonuclear weapons. There are growing concerns about a loss of momentum in the nuclear disarmament process, additional states acquiring nuclear weapons, and the possibility of nuclear terrorism. Fissile materials, ordinarily plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU), are the essential ingredients in all nuclear weapons. Securing, consolidating, and eliminating fissile material stocks worldwide are the common imperatives in the overlapping efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons in the countries where they exist, halt their spread to still more countries, and prevent terrorists from obtaining them. This is the second report by International Panel on Fissile Materials on the global situation with regard to efforts to secure and eliminate fissile materials. The International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) was founded in January 2006 and is an independent group of arms-control and nonproliferation experts from both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states. The mission of the IPFM is to analyze the technical basis for practical and achievable policy initiatives to secure, consolidate, and reduce stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and plutonium. These fissile materials are the key ingredients in nuclear weapons, and their control is critical to nuclear weapons disarmament, to halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and to ensuring that terrorists do not acquire nuclear weapons. Both military and civilian stocks of fissile materials have to be addressed. The nuclear-weapon states still have enough fissile materials in their weapon stockpiles for tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. On the civilian side, enough plutonium has been separated to make a similarly large number of weapons. Highly enriched uranium is used in civilian reactor fuel in more than one hundred locations. The total amount used for this purpose is sufficient to make about one thousand Hiroshima-type bombs, a design well within the potential capabilities of terrorist groups. The Panel has been co-chaired since 2015 by Professor Alexander Glaser and Dr. Zia Mian of Princeton University and Professor Tatsujiro Suzuki of Nagasaki University, Japan. Previously, it was co-chaired by Professor Jose Goldemberg of the University of Sao Paolo, Brazil (2006-2007), Dr. R. Rajaraman (2007-2014) Professor Emeritus, of Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India, and Professor Frank von Hippel of Princeton University (2006-2014). Its members include nuclear experts from seventeen countries: Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Iran, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Pakistan, South Korea, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. This group of countries includes seven nuclear-weapon states and ten non-weapon states. IPFM research and reports are shared with international organizations, national governments and nongovernmental groups. It has full panel meetings twice a year at capitals around the world in addition to specialist workshops. These meetings and workshops are often in conjunction with international conferences at which IPFM panels and experts make presentations. Princeton University's Program on Science and Global Security provide.…

Softcover. Etat : Gut. 389 S. L03249 Ex-library with Stamp and Library-Signature in Good Condition, Some Traces of Use Sprache: Französisch Gewicht in Gramm: 550.

Softcover. Etat : Très bon. Edition 2006. Ammareal reverse jusqu'à 15% du prix net de cet article à des organisations caritatives. ENGLISH DESCRIPTION Book Condition: Used, Very good. Edition 2006. Ammareal gives back up to 15% of this item's net price to charity organizations.

Softcover. Etat : gut. Echéances du mort précédé de bâillon clair pages.

Couverture souple. Etat : Très bon. Les Cabannes, Fissile, collection Cendrier du voyage, 2007. In-16 broché, 128 pages. Édition originale tirée à 500 exemplaires, un de 20 premiers, numérotés, comportant dans le corps de l'ouvrage 6 interventions originales de Jean-Paul Héraud à l'encre de Chine et au lavis d'encre. Exemplaire signé au colophon par l'auteur et l'artiste.…

Couverture souple. Etat : Comme neuf. Les Cabannes, Fissile, 2008. In-16 broché, couverture rempliée, 48 pages. Édition originale tirée à 500 exemplaires, un des 20 premiers numérotés et signés par l'auteur et enrichis d'un très beau collage original signé d'Élizabeth Pulignano. Guillaume Apollinaire, Paul Éluard, Robert Desnos, Tristan Tzara, Max Jacob, Louis Aragon : pour chacun des 6 auteurs retenus dans cette « anthologie » de poche, Gérard Arseguel a sélectionné un ou deux poèmes et détourné une courte notice biographique de Wikipédia. Il a ensuite passé le tout au traducteur automatique, du français à l'anglais, puis de l''nglais au français. « La grâce et la fraîcheur machinales de l'insensé ».…

Wraps. Etat : Good. Presumed First Edition, First printing. This consists of a Summary volume ([4], vii. [1], 54, [2] pages); Volume I - Part A (various paginations, approximately 400 pages); Volume I - Part B (various paginations, approximately 570 pages); Volume II (various paginations, approximately 500 pages, rear cover and several back pages creased); Volume III - Part A Comment Response Document (various paginations, approximately 1150 pages); and Volume III - Part B Comment Response Document (various paginations, approximately 800 pages). Tables. Figures. Footnotes, Acronyms. maps. Name written in ink on two covers. Covers have some wear and soiling. Minor edge soiling. Interior appears unmarked. The SPD EIS analyzes a nominal 50 metric tons (t) (55 tons) of surplus weapons-usable plutonium, which is | primarily in the form of pits (the core element of a nuclear weapon's fission component), metals, and oxides. In addition to 38.2 t (42 tons) of weapons-grade plutonium already declared by the President as excess to national security needs, the material analyzed includes weapons-grade plutonium that may be declared surplus in the future, as well as weapons-usable, reactor-grade plutonium that is surplus to the programmatic and national defense needs of DOE. In December 1996, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) published the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (Storage and Disposition PEIS) (DOE 1996a). That PEIS analyzes the potential environmental consequences of alternative strategies for the long-term storage of weapons-usable plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) and the disposition of weapons-usable plutonium that has been or may be declared surplus to national security needs. The Record of Decision (ROD) for the Storage and Disposition PEIS, issued on January 14, 1997 (DOE 1997a), outlines DOE's decision to pursue an approach to plutonium disposition that would make surplus weapons-usable plutonium inaccessible and unattractive for weapons use. DOE's disposition strategy, consistent with the Preferred Alternative analyzed in the Storage and Disposition PEIS, allows for both the immobilization of some(and potentially all) of the surplus plutonium and use of some of the surplus plutonium as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in existing domestic, commercial reactors. The disposition of surplus plutonium would also involve disposal of both the immobilized plutonium and the MOX fuel (as spent nuclear fuel) in a potential geologic repository. The purpose of and need for the proposed action is to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation worldwide by conducting disposition of surplus plutonium in the United States in an environmentally safe and timely manner. Comprehensive disposition actions are needed to ensure that surplus plutonium is converted to proliferation-resistant forms. In September 1993, President Clinton issued the Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy (White House 1993) in response to the growing threat of nuclear proliferation. Further, in January 1994, President Clinton and Russia's President Yeltsin issued a Joint Statement Between the United States and Russia on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Means of Their Delivery (White House 1994). In accordance with these policies, the focus of the U.S. nonproliferation efforts includes ensuring the safe, secure, long-term storage and disposition of surplus weapons-usable fissile plutonium. Following publication of the SPD Draft EIS, the United States and Russia signed a 5-year agreement to provide | the scientific and technical basis for decisions concerning how surplus plutonium will be managed and a statement of principles with the intention of removing approximately 50 t (55 tons) of plutonium from each country's Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final Environmental Impact Statement A MOX lead assembly is a prototype reactor fuel assembly that contains MOX fuel. Should the No Action Alternative be chosen, the ROD purs. …