Edité par Cambridge University Press, 1999
ISBN 10 : 0521644151 ISBN 13 : 9780521644150
Langue: anglais
Vendeur : Ystwyth Books, Aberystwyth, Royaume-Uni
EUR 29,76
Autre deviseQuantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Ajouter au panierSoft cover. Etat : Fine. Fine copy. No additions.
Edité par Cambridge University Press, 2009
ISBN 10 : 0521644151 ISBN 13 : 9780521644150
Langue: anglais
Vendeur : Anybook.com, Lincoln, Royaume-Uni
EUR 31,92
Autre deviseQuantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Ajouter au panierEtat : Fair. Volume 65. This is an ex-library book and may have the usual library/used-book markings inside.This book has soft covers. Clean from markings. In fair condition, suitable as a study copy. Library sticker on front cover. Please note the Image in this listing is a stock photo and may not match the covers of the actual item,700grams, ISBN:9780521644150.
Edité par Cambridge University Press, 1999
ISBN 10 : 0521644151 ISBN 13 : 9780521644150
Langue: anglais
Vendeur : Books From California, Simi Valley, CA, Etats-Unis
EUR 33,37
Autre deviseQuantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Ajouter au panierpaperback. Etat : Very Good.
Edité par Cambridge University Press, 1999
ISBN 10 : 0521644151 ISBN 13 : 9780521644150
Langue: anglais
Vendeur : Better World Books, Mishawaka, IN, Etats-Unis
EUR 36,88
Autre deviseQuantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Ajouter au panierEtat : Good. Former library book; may include library markings. Used book that is in clean, average condition without any missing pages.
Edité par Cambridge University Press, 1999
ISBN 10 : 0521644151 ISBN 13 : 9780521644150
Langue: anglais
Vendeur : Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Royaume-Uni
EUR 61,75
Autre deviseQuantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Ajouter au panierEtat : New. In.
Edité par Cambridge University Press, 1999
ISBN 10 : 0521644151 ISBN 13 : 9780521644150
Langue: anglais
Vendeur : California Books, Miami, FL, Etats-Unis
EUR 61,49
Autre deviseQuantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Ajouter au panierEtat : New.
Edité par Cambridge University Press 2009-06-01, 2009
ISBN 10 : 0521644151 ISBN 13 : 9780521644150
Langue: anglais
Vendeur : Chiron Media, Wallingford, Royaume-Uni
EUR 58,17
Autre deviseQuantité disponible : 10 disponible(s)
Ajouter au panierPaperback. Etat : New.
Edité par Cambridge University Press, 1999
ISBN 10 : 0521644151 ISBN 13 : 9780521644150
Langue: anglais
Vendeur : GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, Etats-Unis
EUR 55,41
Autre deviseQuantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Ajouter au panierEtat : New.
Edité par Cambridge University Press, 1999
ISBN 10 : 0521644151 ISBN 13 : 9780521644150
Langue: anglais
Vendeur : GreatBookPricesUK, Woodford Green, Royaume-Uni
EUR 61,12
Autre deviseQuantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Ajouter au panierEtat : New.
Edité par Cambridge University Press, 1999
ISBN 10 : 0521644151 ISBN 13 : 9780521644150
Langue: anglais
Vendeur : GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, Etats-Unis
EUR 62,88
Autre deviseQuantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Ajouter au panierEtat : As New. Unread book in perfect condition.
Edité par Cambridge University Press CUP, 1999
ISBN 10 : 0521644151 ISBN 13 : 9780521644150
Langue: anglais
Vendeur : Books Puddle, New York, NY, Etats-Unis
EUR 76,06
Autre deviseQuantité disponible : 4 disponible(s)
Ajouter au panierEtat : New. pp. 364, Map.
Edité par Cambridge University Press, 1999
ISBN 10 : 0521644151 ISBN 13 : 9780521644150
Langue: anglais
Vendeur : GreatBookPricesUK, Woodford Green, Royaume-Uni
EUR 67,65
Autre deviseQuantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Ajouter au panierEtat : As New. Unread book in perfect condition.
Edité par Cambridge University Press, 1999
ISBN 10 : 0521644151 ISBN 13 : 9780521644150
Langue: anglais
Vendeur : Bay State Book Company, North Smithfield, RI, Etats-Unis
EUR 37,90
Autre deviseQuantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Ajouter au panierEtat : acceptable. The book is complete and readable, with all pages and cover intact. Dust jacket, shrink wrap, or boxed set case may be missing. Pages may have light notes, highlighting, or minor water exposure, but nothing that affects readability. May be an ex-library copy and could include library markings or stickers.
Vendeur : Revaluation Books, Exeter, Royaume-Uni
EUR 81,92
Autre deviseQuantité disponible : 2 disponible(s)
Ajouter au panierPaperback. Etat : Brand New. 342 pages. 9.00x6.25x1.00 inches. In Stock.
Edité par Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999
ISBN 10 : 0521644151 ISBN 13 : 9780521644150
Langue: anglais
Vendeur : CitiRetail, Stevenage, Royaume-Uni
EUR 66,05
Autre deviseQuantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Ajouter au panierPaperback. Etat : new. Paperback. Despite their increasing importance, there is little theoretical understanding of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions, or what determines their success. This book argues that both imposers and targets of economic coercion incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their behaviour. Drezner argues that conflict expectations have a paradoxical effect. Adversaries will impose sanctions frequently, but rarely secure concessions. Allies will be reluctant to use coercion, but once sanctions are used, they can result in significant concessions. Ironically, the most favourable distribution of payoffs is likely to result when the imposer cares the least about its reputation or the distribution of gains. The book's argument is pursued using game theory and statistical analysis, and detailed case studies of Russia's relations with newly-independent states, and US efforts to halt nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula. The conventional wisdom is that economic sanctions do not work in international affairs. If so, why do countries wield them so often? Daniel Drezner argues that, paradoxically, countries are most likely to be willing to use sanctions under conditions where they will produce the feeblest results. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.
Edité par Cambridge University Press, 1999
ISBN 10 : 0521644151 ISBN 13 : 9780521644150
Langue: anglais
Vendeur : AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Allemagne
EUR 85,60
Autre deviseQuantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Ajouter au panierTaschenbuch. Etat : Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This 1999 argues that, paradoxically, countries are likely to use sanctions under conditions where they will produce the feeblest results.
Edité par Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999
ISBN 10 : 0521644151 ISBN 13 : 9780521644150
Langue: anglais
Vendeur : AussieBookSeller, Truganina, VIC, Australie
EUR 86,92
Autre deviseQuantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Ajouter au panierPaperback. Etat : new. Paperback. Despite their increasing importance, there is little theoretical understanding of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions, or what determines their success. This book argues that both imposers and targets of economic coercion incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their behaviour. Drezner argues that conflict expectations have a paradoxical effect. Adversaries will impose sanctions frequently, but rarely secure concessions. Allies will be reluctant to use coercion, but once sanctions are used, they can result in significant concessions. Ironically, the most favourable distribution of payoffs is likely to result when the imposer cares the least about its reputation or the distribution of gains. The book's argument is pursued using game theory and statistical analysis, and detailed case studies of Russia's relations with newly-independent states, and US efforts to halt nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula. The conventional wisdom is that economic sanctions do not work in international affairs. If so, why do countries wield them so often? Daniel Drezner argues that, paradoxically, countries are most likely to be willing to use sanctions under conditions where they will produce the feeblest results. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.
Edité par Cambridge University Press, 1999
ISBN 10 : 0521644151 ISBN 13 : 9780521644150
Langue: anglais
Vendeur : Lucky's Textbooks, Dallas, TX, Etats-Unis
EUR 54,23
Autre deviseQuantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Ajouter au panierEtat : New.
Edité par Cambridge University Press, 2009
ISBN 10 : 0521644151 ISBN 13 : 9780521644150
Langue: anglais
Vendeur : HPB-Red, Dallas, TX, Etats-Unis
EUR 34,39
Autre deviseQuantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Ajouter au panierPaperback. Etat : Acceptable. Connecting readers with great books since 1972. Used textbooks may not include companion materials such as access codes, etc. May have condition issues including wear and notes/highlighting. We ship orders daily and Customer Service is our top priority!
Edité par Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999
ISBN 10 : 0521644151 ISBN 13 : 9780521644150
Langue: anglais
Vendeur : Grand Eagle Retail, Mason, OH, Etats-Unis
EUR 66,54
Autre deviseQuantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Ajouter au panierPaperback. Etat : new. Paperback. Despite their increasing importance, there is little theoretical understanding of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions, or what determines their success. This book argues that both imposers and targets of economic coercion incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their behaviour. Drezner argues that conflict expectations have a paradoxical effect. Adversaries will impose sanctions frequently, but rarely secure concessions. Allies will be reluctant to use coercion, but once sanctions are used, they can result in significant concessions. Ironically, the most favourable distribution of payoffs is likely to result when the imposer cares the least about its reputation or the distribution of gains. The book's argument is pursued using game theory and statistical analysis, and detailed case studies of Russia's relations with newly-independent states, and US efforts to halt nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula. The conventional wisdom is that economic sanctions do not work in international affairs. If so, why do countries wield them so often? Daniel Drezner argues that, paradoxically, countries are most likely to be willing to use sanctions under conditions where they will produce the feeblest results. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.
Edité par Cambridge University Press, 1999
ISBN 10 : 0521644151 ISBN 13 : 9780521644150
Langue: anglais
Vendeur : SecondSale, Montgomery, IL, Etats-Unis
EUR 219,18
Autre deviseQuantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Ajouter au panierEtat : Very Good. Item in very good condition! Textbooks may not include supplemental items i.e. CDs, access codes etc.
Edité par Cambridge University Press, 1999
ISBN 10 : 0521644151 ISBN 13 : 9780521644150
Langue: anglais
Vendeur : THE SAINT BOOKSTORE, Southport, Royaume-Uni
EUR 62,77
Autre deviseQuantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Ajouter au panierPaperback / softback. Etat : New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days 615.
Vendeur : Revaluation Books, Exeter, Royaume-Uni
EUR 60,53
Autre deviseQuantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Ajouter au panierPaperback. Etat : Brand New. 342 pages. 9.00x6.25x1.00 inches. In Stock. This item is printed on demand.
Edité par Cambridge University Press, 2009
ISBN 10 : 0521644151 ISBN 13 : 9780521644150
Langue: anglais
Vendeur : moluna, Greven, Allemagne
EUR 64,81
Autre deviseQuantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Ajouter au panierEtat : New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. The conventional wisdom is that economic sanctions do not work in international affairs. If so, why do countries wield them so often? This 1999 book argues that, paradoxically, countries are most likely to be willing to use sanctions under conditions where .
Edité par Cambridge University Press, 1999
ISBN 10 : 0521644151 ISBN 13 : 9780521644150
Langue: anglais
Vendeur : Majestic Books, Hounslow, Royaume-Uni
EUR 77,09
Autre deviseQuantité disponible : 4 disponible(s)
Ajouter au panierEtat : New. Print on Demand pp. 364 Figures, 2:B&W 6 x 9 in or 229 x 152 mm Perfect Bound on Creme w/Gloss Lam, Map.
Edité par Cambridge University Press, 1999
ISBN 10 : 0521644151 ISBN 13 : 9780521644150
Langue: anglais
Vendeur : Biblios, Frankfurt am main, HESSE, Allemagne
EUR 79,98
Autre deviseQuantité disponible : 4 disponible(s)
Ajouter au panierEtat : New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 364 4 Diagrams.