Edité par Princeton University Press, 2008
ISBN 10 : 0691133212 ISBN 13 : 9780691133218
Langue: anglais
Vendeur : Labyrinth Books, Princeton, NJ, Etats-Unis
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Edité par Princeton University Press, 2008
ISBN 10 : 0691133212 ISBN 13 : 9780691133218
Langue: anglais
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Ajouter au panierPaperback. Etat : new. Excellent Condition.Excels in customer satisfaction, prompt replies, and quality checks.
Edité par Princeton University Press, 2008
ISBN 10 : 0691133212 ISBN 13 : 9780691133218
Langue: anglais
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Ajouter au panierPaperback. Etat : New. Voters today often desert a preferred candidate for a more viable second choice to avoid wasting their vote. Likewise, parties to a dispute often find themselves unable to agree on a fair division of contested goods. In Mathematics and Democracy, Steven Brams, a leading authority in the use of mathematics to design decision-making processes, shows how social-choice and game theory could make political and social institutions more democratic. Using mathematical analysis, he develops rigorous new procedures that enable voters to better express themselves and that allow disputants to divide goods more fairly. One of the procedures that Brams proposes is "approval voting," which allows voters to vote for as many candidates as they like or consider acceptable. There is no ranking, and the candidate with the most votes wins. The voter no longer has to consider whether a vote for a preferred but less popular candidate might be wasted. In the same vein, Brams puts forward new, more equitable procedures for resolving disputes over divisible and indivisible goods.
Edité par Princeton University Press, US, 2008
ISBN 10 : 0691133212 ISBN 13 : 9780691133218
Langue: anglais
Vendeur : Rarewaves USA United, OSWEGO, IL, Etats-Unis
EUR 67,19
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Ajouter au panierPaperback. Etat : New. Voters today often desert a preferred candidate for a more viable second choice to avoid wasting their vote. Likewise, parties to a dispute often find themselves unable to agree on a fair division of contested goods. In Mathematics and Democracy, Steven Brams, a leading authority in the use of mathematics to design decision-making processes, shows how social-choice and game theory could make political and social institutions more democratic. Using mathematical analysis, he develops rigorous new procedures that enable voters to better express themselves and that allow disputants to divide goods more fairly. One of the procedures that Brams proposes is "approval voting," which allows voters to vote for as many candidates as they like or consider acceptable. There is no ranking, and the candidate with the most votes wins. The voter no longer has to consider whether a vote for a preferred but less popular candidate might be wasted. In the same vein, Brams puts forward new, more equitable procedures for resolving disputes over divisible and indivisible goods.
Edité par Princeton University Press 1/6/2008, 2008
ISBN 10 : 0691133212 ISBN 13 : 9780691133218
Langue: anglais
Vendeur : BargainBookStores, Grand Rapids, MI, Etats-Unis
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Ajouter au panierPaperback or Softback. Etat : New. Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division Procedures 1.22. Book.
Edité par Princeton University Press, 2008
ISBN 10 : 0691133212 ISBN 13 : 9780691133218
Langue: anglais
Vendeur : GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, Etats-Unis
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Edité par Princeton University Press, 2008
ISBN 10 : 0691133212 ISBN 13 : 9780691133218
Langue: anglais
Vendeur : GreatBookPricesUK, Woodford Green, Royaume-Uni
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Ajouter au panierPaperback. Etat : Brand New. illustrated edition. 390 pages. 9.00x6.25x1.00 inches. In Stock.
Edité par Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2008
ISBN 10 : 0691133212 ISBN 13 : 9780691133218
Langue: anglais
Vendeur : CitiRetail, Stevenage, Royaume-Uni
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Ajouter au panierPaperback. Etat : new. Paperback. Voters today often desert a preferred candidate for a more viable second choice to avoid wasting their vote. Likewise, parties to a dispute often find themselves unable to agree on a fair division of contested goods. In Mathematics and Democracy, Steven Brams, a leading authority in the use of mathematics to design decision-making processes, shows how social-choice and game theory could make political and social institutions more democratic. Using mathematical analysis, he develops rigorous new procedures that enable voters to better express themselves and that allow disputants to divide goods more fairly. One of the procedures that Brams proposes is "approval voting," which allows voters to vote for as many candidates as they like or consider acceptable. There is no ranking, and the candidate with the most votes wins. The voter no longer has to consider whether a vote for a preferred but less popular candidate might be wasted. In the same vein, Brams puts forward new, more equitable procedures for resolving disputes over divisible and indivisible goods. Voters often desert a preferred candidate for a more viable second choice to avoid wasting their vote. Likewise, parties to a dispute often find themselves unable to agree on a fair division of contested goods. This book shows how social-choice and game theory could make political and social institutions more democratic. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.
Edité par Princeton University Press, 2008
ISBN 10 : 0691133212 ISBN 13 : 9780691133218
Langue: anglais
Vendeur : BennettBooksLtd, North Las Vegas, NV, Etats-Unis
EUR 79,13
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Ajouter au panierpaperback. Etat : New. In shrink wrap. Looks like an interesting title!
Edité par Princeton University Press, 2008
ISBN 10 : 0691133212 ISBN 13 : 9780691133218
Langue: anglais
Vendeur : moluna, Greven, Allemagne
EUR 52,06
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Ajouter au panierEtat : New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Voters often desert a preferred candidate for a more viable second choice to avoid wasting their vote. Likewise, parties to a dispute often find themselves unable to agree on a fair division of contested goods. This book shows how social-choice and game the.
Edité par Princeton University Press, 2008
ISBN 10 : 0691133212 ISBN 13 : 9780691133218
Langue: anglais
Vendeur : AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Allemagne
EUR 64,54
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Ajouter au panierTaschenbuch. Etat : Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - Voters today often desert a preferred candidate for a more viable second choice to avoid wasting their vote. Likewise, parties to a dispute often find themselves unable to agree on a fair division of contested goods. In Mathematics and Democracy, Steven Brams, a leading authority in the use of mathematics to design decision-making processes, shows how social-choice and game theory could make political and social institutions more democratic. Using mathematical analysis, he develops rigorous new procedures that enable voters to better express themselves and that allow disputants to divide goods more fairly.One of the procedures that Brams proposes is 'approval voting,' which allows voters to vote for as many candidates as they like or consider acceptable. There is no ranking, and the candidate with the most votes wins. The voter no longer has to consider whether a vote for a preferred but less popular candidate might be wasted. In the same vein, Brams puts forward new, more equitable procedures for resolving disputes over divisible and indivisible goods.