ISBN: 9783836469821 - habits in action: a corrective to the neglect of habits in contemporary philosophy of action (14 résultats)

Etat : New.

Etat : As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Etat : New.

Etat : New.

Etat : New. In English.

Etat : As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Etat : New. pp. 236.

Kartoniert / Broschiert. Etat : New. We are creatures of habit. Today s philosophers don t appreciate this. The result is that we tend to intellectualise rational human actions by assuming they result from processes of reasoning, when in fact actions usually consist of familiar routines do.

PF. Etat : New. This item is printed on demand. Brand new book, sourced directly from publisher. Dispatch time is 6-7 days from our warehouse. Book will be sent in robust, secure packaging to ensure it reaches you securely.

PAP. Etat : New. New Book. Shipped from UK. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

PAP. Etat : New. New Book. Delivered from our UK warehouse in 4 to 14 business days. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - We are creatures of habit. Today''s philosophers don''t appreciate this. The result is that we tend to 'intellectualise' rational human actions by assuming they result from processes of reasoning, when in fact actions usually consist of familiar routines done without any thought at all. Intellectualism misrepresents actions and creates intractable problems. This book offers a solution.An analysis is offered of habitual actions as repeated, automatic behaviours, which are also responsible since they are under the agent''s control. This analysis is located in an anti-intellectual tradition shared by Aristotle, Ryle and Wittgenstein. Against Davidson, McDowell and Dancy who assume rational actions are 'actions for reasons', a non-intellectual habit-centred conception of rational actions is proposed. This conception provides new resources for virtue theoretical criticism of Humean thinkers like Smith and Blackburn, and for clarification of McDowell''s naturalism.This book will appeal to professional philosophers and students working in philosophy of action, philosophy of mind, ethics or moral psychology, and anyone else interested in the nature of human action and rationality.; We are creatures of habit. Today's philosophers don't appreciate this. The result is that we tend to 'intellectualise' rational human actions by assuming they result from processes of reasoning, when in fact actions usually consist of familiar routines done without any thought at all. Intellectualism misrepresents actions and creates intractable problems. This book offers a solution.An analysis is offered of habitual actions as repeated, automatic behaviours, which are also responsible since they are under the agent's control. This analysis is located in an anti-intellectual tradition shared by Aristotle, Ryle and Wittgenstein. Against Davidson, McDowell and Dancy who assume rational actions are 'actions for reasons', a non-intellectual habit-centred conception of rational actions is proposed. This conception provides new resources for virtue theoretical criticism of Humean thinkers like Smith and Blackburn, and for clarification of McDowell's naturalism.This book will appeal to professional philosophers and students working in philosophy of action, philosophy of mind, ethics or moral psychology, and anyone else interested in the nature of human action and rationality.…

Etat : New. Print on Demand pp. 236 23:B&W 6 x 9 in or 229 x 152 mm Perfect Bound on White w/Gloss Lam.

Etat : New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 236.