Force restraint strategic deterrence (31 résultats)

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Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. Neuware - A great power's use of its military forces may be rendered ineffective or even counterproductive when there are no clear internationally recognizable limits on this use of force. Professor Myerson derives this conclusion from the basic observation that our ability to influence potential rivals depends on a balanced mix of threats and promises. Potential adversaries should believe that aggression will be punished, but such threats will be useless unless they also believe our promises that good behavior will be better rewarded. A reputation for resolve makes threats credible, but a great power also needs a reputation for restraint, to make the promises credible as well. Thus, international restraints on a nation's use of military force may actually increase the effective influence of its military strength.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.…

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Buch. Etat : Neu. Neuware - A great power's use of its military forces may be rendered ineffective or even counterproductive when there are no clear internationally recognizable limits on this use of force. Professor Myerson derives this conclusion from the basic observation that our ability to influence potential rivals depends on a balanced mix of threats and promises. Potential adversaries should believe that aggression will be punished, but such threats will be useless unless they also believe our promises that good behavior will be better rewarded. A reputation for resolve makes threats credible, but a great power also needs a reputation for restraint, to make the promises credible as well. Thus, international restraints on a nation's use of military force may actually increase the effective influence of its military strength.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.…

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Wraps. Presumed first edition/first printing. vi, 25, [1] p. Illustrations. Endnotes. This is one of the Advancing Strategic Thought series. From Wikipedia: "This monograph is a short nontechnical introduction to the use of game theory in the study of international relations, focusing is on the problem of deterrence against potential adversaries and aggressors. The author uses game models to provide a simple context where we can see more clearly the essential logic of strategic deterrence. Dr. Roger B. Myerson, winner of the 2007 Nobel Prize in Economics, is the Glen A. Lloyd Distinguished Service Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago. Dr. Myerson is the author of two books and many professional articles on game theory, information economics, and economic analysis of political institutions. He is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Dr. Myerson was elected Vice President of the Econometric Society in 2006. Dr. Myerson holds a Ph.D. from Harvard University. The above information may not be current. It was current at the time when the individual worked for SSI or was published by SSI. Very good. Cover has slight wear and soiling.…

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Etat : New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 34.

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