game theoretic methods general equilibrium (16 résultats)

Hardcover. Etat : Very Good. 1994. It's a well-cared-for item that has seen limited use. The item may show minor signs of wear. All the text is legible, with all pages included. It may have slight markings and/or highlighting.

Etat : New. In.

Etat : New. In.

Etat : New. Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Study Institute, Long Island, NY, U.S.A., July 1--12, 1991 Editor(s): Mertens, Jean-Francois; Sorin, Sylvain. Series: NATO Science Series D:. Num Pages: 268 pages, biography. BIC Classification: KCH. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly. Dimension: 297 x 210 x 17. Weight in Grams: 565. . 1994. Hardback. . . . .

Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - JEAN-FRANQOIS MERTENS This book presents a systematic exposition of the use of game theoretic methods in general equilibrium analysis. Clearly the first such use was by Arrow and Debreu, with the 'birth' of general equi librium theory itself, in using Nash's existence theorem (or a generalization) to prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium. But this use appeared possibly to be merely tech nical, borrowing some tools for proving a theorem. This book stresses the later contributions, were game theoretic concepts were used as such, to explain various aspects of the general equilibrium model. But clearly, each of those later approaches also provides per sea game theoretic proof of the existence of competitive equilibrium. Part A deals with the first such approach: the equality between the set of competitive equilibria of a perfectly competitive (i.e., every trader has negligible market power) economy and the core of the corresponding cooperative game.

Buch. Etat : Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - JEAN-FRANQOIS MERTENS This book presents a systematic exposition of the use of game theoretic methods in general equilibrium analysis. Clearly the first such use was by Arrow and Debreu, with the 'birth' of general equi librium theory itself, in using Nash's existence theorem (or a generalization) to prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium. But this use appeared possibly to be merely tech nical, borrowing some tools for proving a theorem. This book stresses the later contributions, were game theoretic concepts were used as such, to explain various aspects of the general equilibrium model. But clearly, each of those later approaches also provides per sea game theoretic proof of the existence of competitive equilibrium. Part A deals with the first such approach: the equality between the set of competitive equilibria of a perfectly competitive (i.e., every trader has negligible market power) economy and the core of the corresponding cooperative game.

Paperback. Etat : Brand New. 276 pages. 9.25x6.10x0.63 inches. In Stock.

Etat : New. Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Study Institute, Long Island, NY, U.S.A., July 1--12, 1991 Editor(s): Mertens, Jean-Francois; Sorin, Sylvain. Series: NATO Science Series D:. Num Pages: 268 pages, biography. BIC Classification: KCH. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly. Dimension: 297 x 210 x 17. Weight in Grams: 565. . 1994. Hardback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Paperback. Etat : Like New. LIKE NEW. SHIPS FROM MULTIPLE LOCATIONS. book.

Gebunden. Etat : New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Study Institute, Long Island, NY, U.S.A., July 1--12, 1991 JEAN-FRANQOIS MERTENS This book presents a systematic exposition of the use of game theoretic methods in general equilibrium analysis. Clearly the first such us.

Etat : New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Study Institute, Long Island, NY, U.S.A., July 1--12, 1991 JEAN-FRANQOIS MERTENS This book presents a systematic exposition of the use of game theoretic methods in general equilibrium analysis. Clearly the first such us.

Buch. Etat : Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -JEAN-FRANQOIS MERTENS This book presents a systematic exposition of the use of game theoretic methods in general equilibrium analysis. Clearly the first such use was by Arrow and Debreu, with the 'birth' of general equi librium theory itself, in using Nash's existence theorem (or a generalization) to prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium. But this use appeared possibly to be merely tech nical, borrowing some tools for proving a theorem. This book stresses the later contributions, were game theoretic concepts were used as such, to explain various aspects of the general equilibrium model. But clearly, each of those later approaches also provides per sea game theoretic proof of the existence of competitive equilibrium. Part A deals with the first such approach: the equality between the set of competitive equilibria of a perfectly competitive (i.e., every trader has negligible market power) economy and the core of the corresponding cooperative game. 276 pp. Englisch.

Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -JEAN-FRANQOIS MERTENS This book presents a systematic exposition of the use of game theoretic methods in general equilibrium analysis. Clearly the first such use was by Arrow and Debreu, with the 'birth' of general equi librium theory itself, in using Nash's existence theorem (or a generalization) to prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium. But this use appeared possibly to be merely tech nical, borrowing some tools for proving a theorem. This book stresses the later contributions, were game theoretic concepts were used as such, to explain various aspects of the general equilibrium model. But clearly, each of those later approaches also provides per sea game theoretic proof of the existence of competitive equilibrium. Part A deals with the first such approach: the equality between the set of competitive equilibria of a perfectly competitive (i.e., every trader has negligible market power) economy and the core of the corresponding cooperative game. 276 pp. Englisch.

Buch. Etat : Neu. Game-Theoretic Methods in General Equilibrium Analysis | S. Sorin (u. a.) | Buch | NATO Science Series D: | iv | Englisch | 1994 | Springer Netherland | EAN 9780792330110 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand.

Buch. Etat : Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -JEAN-FRANQOIS MERTENS This book presents a systematic exposition of the use of game theoretic methods in general equilibrium analysis. Clearly the first such use was by Arrow and Debreu, with the 'birth' of general equi librium theory itself, in using Nash's existence theorem (or a generalization) to prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium. But this use appeared possibly to be merely tech nical, borrowing some tools for proving a theorem. This book stresses the later contributions, were game theoretic concepts were used as such, to explain various aspects of the general equilibrium model. But clearly, each of those later approaches also provides per sea game theoretic proof of the existence of competitive equilibrium. Part A deals with the first such approach: the equality between the set of competitive equilibria of a perfectly competitive (i.e., every trader has negligible market power) economy and the core of the corresponding cooperative game.Springer-Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg 276 pp. Englisch.

Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -JEAN-FRANQOIS MERTENS This book presents a systematic exposition of the use of game theoretic methods in general equilibrium analysis. Clearly the first such use was by Arrow and Debreu, with the 'birth' of general equi librium theory itself, in using Nash's existence theorem (or a generalization) to prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium. But this use appeared possibly to be merely tech nical, borrowing some tools for proving a theorem. This book stresses the later contributions, were game theoretic concepts were used as such, to explain various aspects of the general equilibrium model. But clearly, each of those later approaches also provides per sea game theoretic proof of the existence of competitive equilibrium. Part A deals with the first such approach: the equality between the set of competitive equilibria of a perfectly competitive (i.e., every trader has negligible market power) economy and the core of the corresponding cooperative game.Springer-Verlag KG, Sachsenplatz 4-6, 1201 Wien 276 pp. Englisch.