Frelinger david (17 résultats)

Etat : Good. [ No Hassle 30 Day Returns ][ Ships Daily ] [ Underlining/Highlighting: NONE ] [ Writing: NONE ] [ Edition: Reprint ] Publisher: National Book Network Pub Date: 1/1/2007 Binding: Paperback Pages: 159 Reprint edition.

Etat : good. A copy that has been read, remains in good condition. All pages are intact, and the cover is intact. The spine and cover show signs of wear. Pages can include notes and highlighting and show signs of wear, and the copy can include "From the library of" labels or previous owner inscriptions. 100% GUARANTEE! Shipped with delivery confirmation, if you're not satisfied with purchase please return item! Ships via media mail.…

paperback. Etat : Very Good. Connecting readers with great books since 1972! Used books may not include companion materials, and may have some shelf wear or limited writing. We ship orders daily and Customer Service is our top priority.

Etat : very_good. Gently read. May have name of previous ownership, or ex-library edition. Binding tight; spine straight and smooth, with no creasing; covers clean and crisp. Minimal signs of handling or shelving. 100% GUARANTEE! Shipped with delivery confirmation, if you're not satisfied with purchase please return item! Ships USPS Media Mail.…

Etat : very_good. Gently read. May have name of previous ownership, or ex-library edition. Binding tight; spine straight and smooth, with no creasing; covers clean and crisp. Minimal signs of handling or shelving. 100% GUARANTEE! Shipped with delivery confirmation, if you're not satisfied with purchase please return item! Ships USPS Media Mail.…

Soft cover. Etat : Good. trade paperback in good condition.

Paperback. Etat : Very Good. It's a well-cared-for item that has seen limited use. The item may show minor signs of wear. All the text is legible, with all pages included. It may have slight markings and/or highlighting.

Soft cover. Etat : Fine. No Jacket. Minimal shelf wear.

Softcover. Etat : Very Good+. In print for $30.00. ; Octavo.

Paperback. Etat : Brand New. illustrated edition. 219 pages. 9.00x6.00x0.75 inches. In Stock.

Etat : New. In English.

Etat : Very Good. Used - Very Good.

Trade paperback. Etat : Very good. Presumed First Edition, First printing. lxiii, [1], 453, [1] pages. Illustrations (tables, figures, some with color). Works Cited. This is a RAND Counterinsurgency Study--Final Report. David Charles Gompert (born October 6, 1945) is an American government official and former diplomat who served as the acting Director of National Intelligence (DNI) following the resignation of Dennis C. Blair in 2009. Prior to his ascension as DNI, he was Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, and continued serving in that capacity until 2011. He has worked in senior executive positions at Unisys, AT&T, and most recently as a senior fellow at RAND, a leading research organization that explores topics such as national security, terrorism, economic development, and science and technology. He was a distinguished research professor at the National Defense University's Center for Technology and National Security Policy. From 2003 to 2004, Gompert was the senior adviser for national security and defense to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq . Examines how the United States should improve its counterinsurgency (COIN) capabilities through, for example, much greater focus on understanding jihadist strategy, using civil measures to strengthen the local government, and enabling local forces to conduct COIN operations. Provides a broad discussion of the investments, organizational changes, and multilateral arrangements that the United States should pursue to improve its COIN capabilities. Staff Sergeant Stacy L. Pearsall, USAF (DoD Photo) (illustrateur).…

Trade paperback. Etat : Very good. No DJ issued. Presumed First Edition, First printing. xvii, [1], 133, [1] pages. Footnotes. Figures. Tables. Appendices. References. Minor cover soiling noted. Despite its global advantages, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) s current deterrent posture in the Baltic states is militarily weak and generally questionable. A Russian invasion there would almost surely capture some or all of those states' capital cities within a few days, presenting NATO with a fait accompli. This report examines what role nonstrategic nuclear weapons could play in deterring such an invasion. To achieve deterrence-favorable conditions, NATO would need to consider substantially enhancing and improving its conventional forces based in and near the Baltic states; fielding some limited nonstrategic nuclear weapons feasible for use throughout a conflict, including very early in the conflict; and going through the lengthy and difficult political and military peacetime processes necessary to make prompt response to warnings feasible and credible. What would be an action plan to develop and practice rapid-decision and rapid-action processes to prevent a surprise fait accompli despite major deception operations by Russia (e.g., using exercises to cover preparations for invasion)? How would wargaming results change if the initiating scenario resembled the little green men (masked soldiers in unmarked uniforms) employed by Russia in Ukraine in 2014? Are there ways that limited nuclear use by NATO could be given military value despite Russian quantitative escalation dominance? What options exist for geographically horizontal escalation and for escalation into other domains? Despite its global advantages, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)'s current deterrent posture in the Baltic states is militarily weak and generally questionable. A Russian invasion there would almost surely capture some or all of those states' capital cities within a few days, presenting NATO with a fait accompli. The United States is currently considering tailored deterrence strategies, including options to use nuclear weapons to deter Russian aggression in the Baltic states. This report examines what role nonstrategic nuclear weapons could play in deterring such an invasion. As part of that analysis, the authors review relevant deterrence theory and current NATO and Russian nuclear and conventional force postures in Europe. They draw on wargame exercises and qualitative modeling to characterize the potential outcomes if NATO, Russia, or both employ nonstrategic nuclear weapons during a war in the Baltic states. The authors then discuss implications for using such weapons to deter a Russian invasion. The insights derived from the research highlight the reality that, even if NATO makes significant efforts to modernize its nonstrategic nuclear weapons, it would have much stronger military incentives to end a future war than Russia would. That is, Russia would still enjoy escalation dominance. The do-nothing option is very risky: NATO's current deterrent in the Baltic states is militarily weak and generally questionable. Improvements to conventional forces have the highest priority; they could also enhance the value of some nuclear options. Some of these improvements are underway. Practiced options for extremely fast response without much strategic warning are important because Russia might otherwise find ways, using deception, to accomplish a short-warning fait accompli. Despite Russia's regional escalation dominance, the modernized nuclear options might be valuable in certain circumstances of crisis or conflict if Russian leaders have not already anticipated and discounted the significance of NATO's nuclear use (whether a first use or in response to Russian first use). Given the limited military value for modernized NATO nonstrategic nuclear weapons, some may question the priority of pursuing such modernization. However, modernized nuclear options would reduce Russian asymmetries in theater-nuclear matters, which can be s.…

Paperback. Etat : New.

Etat : New. Satisfaction Guaranteed or your money back.

Etat : New. Satisfaction Guaranteed or your money back.