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Etat : Neu. 165 Seiten DE-10-78 Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 378 8° 15,2 x 1,3 x 21,0 cm, Gebundene Ausgabe.

8°. 165 S., Pappband (sehr gut erhalten) (=Epistemische Studien ; Bd. 17).

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Etat : New. In English.

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Etat : Sehr gut. Zustand: Sehr gut | Sprache: Englisch | Produktart: Bücher | Keine Beschreibung verfügbar.

Etat : New. pp. 165.

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Hardcover. Etat : Brand New. 165 pages. 8.27x5.83x0.71 inches. In Stock.

Etat : New. pp. 165.

Hardback. Etat : New. This book is focused on a problem that has aroused the most controversy in recent epistemological debate, which is whether the truth can or cannot be the fundamental epistemic goal. Traditional epistemology has presupposed the centrality of truth without giving a deeper analysis. To epistemic value pluralists, the claim that truth is the fundamental value seems unjustified. Their central judgement is that we can be in a situation where we do not attain truth but something else that is also epistemically valuable. In contrast, epistemic value monists are committed to the view that one can only attain something of epistemic value by attaining truth. It was necessary to rethink the long-accepted platitude that truth is our primary epistemic goal, once several objections about epistemic value were formulated. The whole debate is instructive for understanding how the epistemic value domain is structured.…

Buch. Etat : Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This book is focused on a problem that has aroused the most controversy in recent epistemological debate, which is whether the truth can or cannot be the fundamental epistemic goal. Traditional epistemology has presupposed the centrality of truth without giving a deeper analysis. To epistemic value pluralists, the claim that truth is the fundamental value seems unjustified. Their central judgement is that we can be in a situation where we do not attain truth but something else that is also epistemically valuable. In contrast, epistemic value monists are committed to the view that one can only attain something of epistemic value by attaining truth. It was necessary to rethink the long-accepted platitude that truth is our primary epistemic goal, once several objections about epistemic value were formulated. The whole debate is instructive for understanding how the epistemic value domain is structured.; Die Reihe präsentiert analytisch orientierte deutsch- und englischsprachige Untersuchungen zu aktuellen Fragen der Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie.…

Hardback. Etat : New. This book is focused on a problem that has aroused the most controversy in recent epistemological debate, which is whether the truth can or cannot be the fundamental epistemic goal. Traditional epistemology has presupposed the centrality of truth without giving a deeper analysis. To epistemic value pluralists, the claim that truth is the fundamental value seems unjustified. Their central judgement is that we can be in a situation where we do not attain truth but something else that is also epistemically valuable. In contrast, epistemic value monists are committed to the view that one can only attain something of epistemic value by attaining truth. It was necessary to rethink the long-accepted platitude that truth is our primary epistemic goal, once several objections about epistemic value were formulated. The whole debate is instructive for understanding how the epistemic value domain is structured.…

Etat : New. 2010. Hardcover. . . . . .

Etat : New. 2010. Hardcover. . . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Hardcover. Etat : New.

Hardcover. Etat : New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. This book is focused on a problem that.

Buch. Etat : Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -This book is focused on a problem that has aroused the most controversy in recent epistemological debate, which is whether the truth can or cannot be the fundamental epistemic goal. Traditional epistemology has presupposed the centrality of truth without giving a deeper analysis. To epistemic value pluralists, the claim that truth is the fundamental value seems unjustified. Their central judgement is that we can be in a situation where we do not attain truth but something else that is also epistemically valuable. In contrast, epistemic value monists are committed to the view that one can only attain something of epistemic value by attaining truth. It was necessary to rethink the long-accepted platitude that truth is our primary epistemic goal, once several objections about epistemic value were formulated. The whole debate is instructive for understanding how the epistemic value domain is structured.Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Genthiner Strasse 13, 10785 Berlin 172 pp. Englisch.…