Thomas c 1921 schelling (7 résultats)

1st edition. Near fine cloth copy in a good if slightly edge-torn and dust-dulled dust-wrapper, now mylar-sleeved. Remains particularly well-preserved overall; tight, bright, clean and strong. Physical description; 291 pp.: diagrs ; 24 cm. Subjects; Income. Economics, Mathematical. Statistics. 1 Kg.

1st edition. Near fine cloth copy in a good if slightly edge-torn and dust-dulled dust-wrapper, now mylar-sleeved. Remains particularly well-preserved overall; tight, bright, clean and strong. Physical description; 291 pp.: diagrs ; 24 cm. Subjects; Income. Economics, Mathematical. Statistics. 1 Kg.

Soft cover. Etat : Very Good. No Jacket. 1st Edition. First Edition, second printing (1st printing, 3/79; 2nd printing, 7/79). Richard G. Lipsey's copy, with his signature on the half-title. xi, 63 pp. Original wrappers. Very Good. A Supplement paper of the Committee for Economic Development, 42. Thomas C. Schelling: Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, 2005 (shared with Robert J. Aumann), 'for having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis.'. …

Hardcover. Etat : new. Hardcover. This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface.We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.…

Hardcover. Etat : Near Fine. Etat de la jaquette : Near Fine. 1st Edition. xi, 2 leaves, 363 pp. Original cloth. Near Fine, in near fine dust jacket (unclipped). The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2005 was awarded jointly to Robert J. Aumann and Thomas C. Schelling 'for having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis.'. …

Hardcover. Etat : Very Good. No Jacket. 1st Edition. vii, 3 leaves, 309 pp. Original cloth. Very Good+, without dust jacket. The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2005 was awarded jointly to Robert J. Aumann and Thomas C. Schelling "for having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis.".…

Soft cover. Etat : Very Good. No Jacket. 1st Edition. First Edition. 1 leaf, pp. 203-64. Original printed wrappers. Loose table of contents laid in. Very Good. Thomas C. Schelling: Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, 2005 (shared with Robert J. Aumann), 'for having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis.' 'An attempt to extend the scope of game theory, using the zero-sum game as a limiting case rather than as a point of departure. The proposed extension consists of identifying the perceptual and suggestive element in the formation of mutually consistent expectations, and of identifying some of the basic 'moves' that may occur in actual games of strategy and the structural elements on which the moves depend. Game theory is underdeveloped along these lines in that 'rational strategies' pursued by two players in a situation of pure conflict should not be expected to reveal what kind of behavior is conductive to mutual accommodation, or how mutual dependence can be exploited for unilateral gain' (Web site of the Rand Corporation, which reprinted the book). '[T]his early work was all in cooperative game theory. John Nash had introduced the basic concept of noncooperative equilibrium in 1951, but in the decade thereafter there was very little work in noncooperative game theory. The most important advance in this decade was Thomas Schelling's (1957, 1958) theory of the focal-point effect in games with multiple equilibria, which he advocated as a better way to understand bargaining in the real world' (Roger Meyerson, 'Learning Game Theory from John Harsanyi', August 31, 2000; on Meyerson's Northwestern Web page). Schelling (1957) to which Meyerson refers is 'Bargaining, communication and limited war' (Journal of Conflict Resolution 1, 19-36). Also see Alessandro Innocenti, 'Linking Strategic Interaction and Bargaining Theory. The Harsanyi - Schelling Debate on the Axiom of Symmetry' (Nov. 2005), in which the University of Siena professor prints an interesting e-mail sent him by Schelling: 'Harsanyi and I overlapped at Yale University for about two years in the 1950s but we had little communication. That was partly because he was shy and reticent, partly I think because his English was not comfortable for him. I believe others had the same experience. I published an article, On the Abandonment of Symmetry in Game Theory in August, 1959, eighteen months after I had left Yale; I included it in my book, The Strategy of Conflict, 1960. It mainly targeted Harsanyi's work, but I am not aware that he paid any attention to it. We certainly did not correspond about it. I wish we had. That's about all I can tell you. I wish I had more.'.…